SGDSN in English

The secretariat for the Defence and National Security Council assists the Secretary General for Defence and National Security in preparing the meetings of the Defence and National Security Council. The secretariat team is composed of three general or senior officers. At the end of each council meeting, the SGDSN prepares records and notifies the decisions taken and monitors their implementation. To this end, it liaises with the ministerial departments concerned. The Defence and National Security Council meets in two specialised formations that address specific subjects with an adapted composition: the Nuclear Armaments Council (CAN) and the National Intelligence Council (CNR). 

Since July 2016 in Nice, the Defence and National Security Council has met several times a month. The SGDSN, based on interministerial work, prepares a file for each council for the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the ministers and other participants. This file, according to the items on the agenda, which can then cover a wide range of subjects from national security to crisis management and external operations, includes analyses and action proposals.

The successive crises facing our country (Covid-19, war in Ukraine, climate change), in a context of growing interdependence, have led the SGDSN to re-examine its ability to deal with major and cross-sectoral crises, whatever their origins. In April 2022, the Prime Minister’s Office approved a national resilience strategy (SNR) that/which aims to better prepare France, its companies and its citizens to face these shocks and to “stand over time, collectively and in depth”, in line with our international and European commitments. The national resilience strategy, initially focused on the public administration, was approved by the Prime Minister’s Office on 21 April 2022 and is made up of three main components: 

• A conceptual reference document, setting out a shared vision of the world, with interdependencies and threats, and defining our key resilience objectives, both at the national and individual level; 
• A table of 73 actions defined around three strategic objectives: 1/ prepare the State in depth for crises, 2/ develop the human and material capabilities to face them, 3/ adapt public communication to the challenges of resilience; ˗ 
• Sheets stating the objectives, indicators and possible difficulties of the identified actions. Its follow-up is ensured by an interministerial commission that meets twice a year under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister’s Office, whose secretariat is provided by the SGDSN. 

In addition, the SGDSN keeps implementing its mandate by monitoring the implementation of the SNR with local authorities, economic operators and the general public, in order to involve all citizens in the resilience of the nation.

Steering the security of activities of vital importance (SAIV). Since they contribute to the production and distribution of goods or services essential to the exercise of State authority, the functioning of the economy, the maintenance of defence potential or the security of the Nation, certain activities are considered to be of “vital importance”. These activities are, by nature, difficult to substitute or replace. Designed and managed by the SGDSN, the SAIV system constitutes the framework for associating operators of vital importance (OVI), whether public or private, to the implementation of the national security strategy in terms of protection against malicious acts (terrorism, sabotage), as well as natural, technological and health risks.

The General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN) is commissioned by the Prime Minister with preparing governmental plans and assessing the State’s capability to face natural and technological risks and threats, such as chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological, (CBNR), air, maritime, energy and cyber threats. The diversity and complexity of the threats, as well as their transnational nature, require significant cooperation with all of the ministries concerned, as well as with French and foreign institutional and private experts. To test these governmental plans, major exercises are organized every year. Lessons learned from these major exercises and actual crises are used to: 

• improve interministerial procedures; 
• increase the responsiveness and effectiveness of crisis management bodies; 
• adapt governmental plans. 

Drawn up in a collegial manner, in liaison with the ministries and operators, this feedback determines the actions to take to achieve the objectives identified above. The General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN) also coordinates the activities of the various ministerial departments involved in aviation and land transport security. For these missions, it relies on the Interministerial Commission for Aviation Security (CISA) and the Interministerial Commission for Land Transport Security (CISTTer), chaired by the Prime Minister’s Office. Lastly, the GSDNS defines and leads the training policy for crisis management stakeholders (PAGC) intended for personnel of the ministries likely to be part of the interministerial crisis unit (CIC) and the ministries’ operational centres. This training thereby creates a pool of individuals capable of handling major crises.

The SGDSN provides the highest authorities of the State with a watch-and-alert mission aiming at rapidly informing them of an event or information that, in the field of national defence and security, may require a decision or measures of an interministerial scope. It assists the Prime Minister in the political and strategic management of major crises. To this end, it may propose: 

• the activation of the interministerial crisis unit (CIC) and the designation of the minister in charge of it; 
• the triggering of government response or intervention plans or the implementation of certain measures without setting off the plan; 
• the adaptation of the Vigipirate posture in the event of a terrorist crisis; 
• decisions of a political nature; 
• the activation of the EU’s political coordination mechanism in the event of a crisis (IPCR).

National defense secrecy, through physical and organisational security measures, protects information whose disclosure or access would be likely to harm national defense and security. 

This secrecy is invoked in many areas of public action (political, military, diplomatic, scientific, economic and industrial) as long as the information and media it is intended to protect have been classified. It is an essential protection measure against espionage by foreign intelligence services and attempts at destabilization by terrorist, criminal or subversive groups or isolated individuals, and helps to safeguard the fundamental interests of the Nation. 

The SGDSN leads interministerial policies contributing to the protection of national defence secrets. As such, it develops the relevant standards, monitors and verifies their application. It also ensures a legal watch in order to make the regulations evolve. 

At the international level, the SGDSN, in its capacity as the national security authority (ANS), is the interlocutor for foreign States in the negotiation of General Security Agreements (GSA) allowing the exchange of classified information with external partners. It also ensures the security of classified information of the European Union (EU) and classified information of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Created in 2009, the French National Cyber Security Agency (ANSSI) is the national authority for the security of information systems (cybersecurity agency). Its action for the protection of the Nation against cyberattacks is translated into four main missions: 

1. Defending… 
   • the Nation’s critical information systems by designing and operating the deployment of cyberattack detection capabilities; 
   • the victims of major cyberattacks; 
   • the Nation by structuring at the national level the assistance to victims of cyberattacks. 
2. Knowing/Being aware of… 
   • the state of the art in technology and information systems security ensuring the agency’s expertise; 
   • the threats and risks in cyberspace to develop methods and tools to address them; 
   • the trends in the world of cybersecurity, in France, Europe and internationally, in order to be fully involved in defending a unique vision of security and stability in cyberspace. 
3. Sharing… 
   • cybersecurity recommendations, solutions and tools to cybersecurity and digital transformation stakeholders to leverage the agency’s action and strengthen collective cybersecurity; 
   • on the response to the threat within the French, European and international technical, operational and strategic cooperation networks; 
   • the agency’s expertise in the field of cybersecurity to train civil servants and regulated operators in cybersecurity; 
   • knowledge of cybersecurity on a broad basis and encourage the development of the cybersecurity sector and training courses; 
   • in conjunction with its partners, to raise awareness about cyber risks among citizens. 
4. Supporting… 
   • the development of a French cybersecurity doctrine and the design of normative and regulatory measures at the national and European levels; 
   • the Government in the deployment of a public policy on cybersecurity; - the highest authorities in their understanding of cyber issues; 
   • the regulated operators in the application of measures to secure their information systems and their responses to incidents; 
   • the development of an ecosystem of providers of trusted products and services in the field of cybersecurity.

The OSIIC (operator of classified interministerial information systems) staff, composed of 300 highly qualified civilian and military personnel in the field of information systems, is responsible for: 

• designing, producing and implementing, anywhere and anytime, the classified interministerial electronic communication resources required by the President of the Republic and the Government; 
• operating and implementing, in all places and at all times, classified means of communication between the President of the Republic, foreign Heads of State or Government, the heads of institutions and other bodies of the European Union and those of other international organisations; 
• in conjunction with the ministries: o defining a master plan for classified interministerial information systems; o designing, implementing, deploying, operating and supporting these systems at all times; 
• participating in the implementation of governmental plans contributing to the continuity of the State and governmental action; 
• drawing up the multi-annual strategy and master plan for the information systems of the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security and providing it with a range of digital services; 
• operating and managing the encryption networks related to its scope of responsibility.

Integrated in hybrid strategies of competition, contestation or confrontation, digital campaigns of information manipulation have become a lever in international power relations. Faced with this informational threat, France decided on 13 July 2021 to create VIGINUM, the State’s technical and operational department responsible for vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference. 

VIGINUM responds to a major challenge: to preserve the public debate from digital campaigns of information manipulation, involving foreign actors and aiming to harm France and its fundamental interests. 

VIGINUM’s main missions are to detect and characterise foreign digital interference affecting the public debate in France. 

To this end, the department studies inauthentic phenomena (suspicious accounts, malicious content, abnormal, irregular or coordinated behaviour) that manifest on digital platforms. 

VIGINUM’s action is part of a more global national and international ecosystem working to combat information manipulation. Within this ecosystem, the department leads and coordinates the interministerial mechanism bringing together the other French administrations contributing to the fight against information manipulation. It maintains close relations with certain independent authorities, such as the audiovisual communications regulatory authority (ARCOM) and the French national commission for data protection and liberties (CNIL). It develops relations with foreign partners and contributes to European and international work, alongside the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs. 

An ethical and scientific committee, reporting to the Secretary General for Defence and National Security, is responsible for monitoring VIGINUM’s activity. It receives all information concerning the implementation of the service’s missions and can make recommendations to the service if necessary.

Led by the Secretariat of Defence and National Security (SGDSN), the system for the protection of the nation’s scientific and technical potential (PPST) aims to protect the most sensitive knowledge, know-how and technologies of public and private institutions located on national territory, whose misuse or appropriation could: 

• undermine the economic interests of the nation; 
• strengthen foreign military arsenals or weaken the nation’s defence capabilities;
• contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; 
• be used for terrorist purposes on national territory or abroad. 

It especially leads to the creation of protected areas known as “restricted areas” in sensitive scientific sectors, the creation of which implies obligations for the institutions, businesses or departments concerned (e.g. submission of access to authorisation after the advice of the competent minister).

The SGDSN controls the export of war material through the Interministerial Commission for the Study and Export of War Material (CIEEMG). Since war materials are subject to a prohibition regime, their export is prohibited without specific authorisations. In France, they take the form of export licences, granted by the Prime Minister on the advice of the CIEEMG. 

The CIEEMG processed 7,300 applications for war material export licences in 2019 and 8,000 applications in 2020. Half of these applications are for modifications or extensions of existing licences. This increase in extension applications in 2020 was due to the pandemic, which slowed down the commercial process and the search for new markets. 

The vast majority of applications are processed electronically and by consensus between the CIEEMG member ministries. 

A plenary session of the CIEEMG is held at the SGDSN every month to address sensitive issues or those that do not elicit a consensus among the commission members. 

In addition, the SGDSN leads certain interministerial and international work concerning the development or modification of war material export policies. As such, the SGDSN is involved in the preparation of regulatory work in this area. 

In 2020, the SGDSN prepared, with the help of industry and the ministries concerned, a guide to the 6 export of “intangible” war material. This document aims to help exporting companies but also to provide a better framework for managing and securing data and information classified as war material, particularly when stored in a cloud, or on a computer when travelling abroad.

The SGDSN is responsible for coordinating interministerial reflection on strategic developments that may affect the interests of France and the European Union in order to propose guidelines and means of action to the President of the Republic and the Government to strengthen national security. It thus carries out, along with the competent ministries, the National Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Coordination (CNRLT) and the intelligence services, analysis and anticipation work in many areas of interest for national defence and security. For example, it is in charge of coordinating interministerial work on hybrid threats.

In close cooperation with the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (MEAE) and other relevant ministries and departments, it participates in the preparation of governmental decisions on the international dimension of security and national defence issues. It is responsible for the co-piloting with the MEAE of national strategies with a geopolitical focus.

At the national level, strengthening the effectiveness of the fight against proliferation first requires better coordination and a strong mobilisation of all ministries concerned. An interministerial coordination mechanism has been set up under the authority of the SGDSN, which also coordinates the interceptions carried out in the framework of the Proliferation Security Initiative. The SGDSNalso leads the work to technically characterise the threat in the nuclear, radiological, bacteriological and chemical fields, and participates alongside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in technical discussions in international bodies addressing these issues. The SGDSN also participates in the control of the export of dual-use goods: it is a member of the Interministerial Commission on Dual-Use Goods (CIBDU), which is responsible for consolidating a position on applications for the export of these goods; it contributes to the establishment of the French position in European institutions and in multilateral regimes for the control of exports of dual-use goods (Wassenaar Arrangement, NSG, Australia Group, MTCR).

The General Secretary chairs the Economic Security Liaison Committee, created in 2019 to strengthen the collegiality of the economic security policy by organising the work of administrations around a single interministerial committee and by promoting the sharing of strategic information between the various stakeholders concerned to guarantee the effectiveness of the system as a whole.

In the space domain, the SGDSN is the interministerial coordinator for the security of European space programs, and as such it draws up a summary of national positions on security issues of European satellite navigation programs (GALILEO and EGNOS), Earth surveillance (COPERNICUS), government satellite communications (GovSatCom) and space surveillance (EU SST). In addition, concerning the GALILEO programme, it is responsible for the public regulated service in France. As such, it supports the development of the service and ensures that its operators and users on the national territory comply with the “common minimum standards” defined at the European level. Since September 2021, it has been performing similar functions for government communications services (competent GovSatCom authority). 

The SGDSN also monitors the dissemination of space images by national operators. This monitoring, carried out based on Title VII of Law No. 2008-518 of 3 June 2008 on space operations, aims at ensuring that the activities of national space data operators do not undermine the fundamental interests of the Nation, in particular national defence, foreign policy and France’s international commitments.