National strategic review

2022
The last few years have brought tragedy back into our lives as events outside our control have affected our nation. Intensified revisionist ambitions, uninhibited opportunism, the health and climate crises and the return of high-intensity warfare on European soil remind us of the far-reaching interdependence between the domestic and international arenas, in terms of food, our economies and energy. The question of our sovereignty and resilience in an interdependent world has taken a new turn.

Since 2017, France has opted to invest more in its armed forces, and to follow a French and European strategy of sovereignty in response to upheaval in the global equilibrium. The last two years have accelerated and intensified transformations.

This fracturing of the world order brings with it challenges and risks that we must address if we are to retain our freedom. Faced with this phenomenon of globalised hybrid warfare, I therefore wanted to see a national approach that is consistent with and complementary to the European Union's Strategic Compass adopted under the French Presidency, and NATO's Strategic Concept launched at our request in 2019, also adopted this year.

Our findings and conclusions from 2017 remain valid. We were not mistaken, so our view remains unchanged, but unchanged does not equate to inertia as events become tougher to handle and move far more quickly. The time has come to draw on our available resources to better equip us in all respects for the historic challenges of a world where the lines between strategic competition and confrontation are becoming blurred. It is a matter of refining our analysis to draw conclusions of operational value.

By 2030, I want France to have consolidated its role as a balancing, united, globally influential power, a driving force for European autonomy, and a power that assumes its responsibilities by contributing, as a reliable and supportive partner, to the preservation of multilateral mechanisms based on international law.

The conclusions of the National Strategic Review make it possible to increase the independence and strength of our Nation in the new strategic context we now see.

Emmanuel Macron

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Part One

Strategic analysis
Assessment of the strategic environment

1) Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 represents a major shift in strategy. Firstly, combined with other core developments, it confirms the changes to the threat assessment observed and described in the 2017 national defence and security strategic review, updated in 2021. Secondly, it calls for adaptation to our strategic response, with the aim of building up our morale and resilience, consolidating our alliances and modernising our defence capability more quickly.

2) **Confirmation.** As described in the 2017 strategic review, tougher strategic competition, the weakening of the tools that build our collective security, the effects of intimidating and aggressive states of readiness, blending military and non-military actions, manipulation of information, and even nuclear threats designed to intimidate seem to have become inevitable around the world, and particularly to our fellow citizens. Global and regional powers shedding any inhibitions about pursuing revisionist agendas and opportunistic military policies is combined with a growing trend towards isolationism or identity-based withdrawal. Furthermore, the consequences of proliferation, technological or otherwise, and the persistence of the terrorist threat continues to resonate. Other major global challenges likely to cause significant imbalance must be added to this picture, such as the impact of climate change: access to water, food insecurity, migration, demographics, pandemics, etc.

3) These circumstances require us to rapidly adapt our global response, to accelerate our efforts to promote the emergence of a common and shared view of European defence and strategic autonomy, to modernise our national defence capability, and to boost our morale, resilience and alliances. The war in Ukraine further justifies the decision of the President of France, made in 2017, to modernise our defence capability.

4) **Consolidation.** We must continue the efforts already made while also accelerating, adapting and supplementing our strategic readiness in response to threats that are themselves changing in their speed, nature and location. Without replacing those posed by terrorism or crisis-management, these threats are part of an environment that increasingly features a high intensity of potential confrontation between conventional forces and what are known as “hybrid” strategies (blending cyber, digital and space attacks) and denial-of-access strategies that jeopardise our interests (exploiting vulnerabilities in logistics chains or infrastructure, or the air-sea arena).

5) By strengthening its resilience, by availing itself of the resources to switch to a war footing, by altering the areas in which it is present according to its strategic interests and by pivoting towards conflict in new areas and this high intensity aspect, France is taking a global approach to entirely fulfil its role as a balancing power and to promote a stable international order based on respect for law and multilateralism. It also intends to support the strengthening of its partners’ sovereignty to enhance the stability and security of the regions concerned.

6) This observation makes it all the more necessary to pursue our efforts to promote the emergence and implementation of a common and shared conception of European defence and its strategic autonomy, complementary to our active participation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and our various partnerships, while guarding against the side effects of the sometimes shifting strategic or geographical priorities of these allies.
7) **Objectives.** While they do not call into question the strategic analysis that has prevailed since 2017, the acceleration in the overall deterioration of our environment and the war in Ukraine nevertheless do justify a reassessment of the current military programming law on the basis of adjusted core strategic objectives (SO) described in this national strategic review.

8) First, the fundamentals remain: France is and will remain a power with a robust and credible nuclear deterrent [SO no. 1], a crucial asset for strategic dialogue and for the protection of our vital interests.

9) At the other end of the spectrum, what sustains our model and gives it credibility is our morale: the morale of the French people, namely, that of a united and resilient France [SO no. 2], that of an economy capable of switching to a war footing [SO no. 3], that of first-class cyber resilience [SO no. 4], all conditions that underpin national sovereignty.

10) However, our influence in the world cannot be based on the principle of sovereignty alone. The principle of solidarity is essential, all the more so in deteriorating circumstances. France intends to be an exemplary and demanding ally within the Euro-Atlantic area [SO no. 5] while also being a driving force behind European strategic autonomy [SO no. 6], a reliable partner in its diplomatic defence relations and a credible provider of security [SO no. 7].

11) Influence has become a strategic function. This new function, now an essential part of the expression of power, is a key element of our ability to promote France’s interests and counter the actions of our competitors across the entire spectrum of hybridity.

12) Supporting deterrence and backed by our morale, in support of our alliances and partnerships, our military capabilities deliver an operational impact of benefit to our defence. Our military capabilities are based on sovereign capabilities, autonomy of assessment and appreciation - an essential step that gives meaning to acts and intentions - anticipation and decision-making [SO no. 8], a willingness and ability to act in hybrid fields in the face our competitors’ increasingly aggressive strategies and circumvention techniques [SO no. 9], as well as a proven ability to conduct high-intensity military operations in extensive areas of conflict [SO no. 10].

13) **Perspectives.** The strategic objectives thus described make it possible to draw up a political and military plan to amend the armed forces model which will be used in the future programming law.

14) This national strategic review explains the underlying factors that guide the work on reassessing the military programming law that is currently in progress. It offers an action-oriented consideration of the changes necessary in terms of, for example, strength of morale, the resilience of the Nation through Universal National Service (SNU), the war economy and the future armed forces model. Finally, it enables the principles on which these changes will be transcribed into the next military programming law (2024-2030) to be established.
1. A WORLD OF RENEWED TENSION

1.1 FROM STRATEGIC COMPETITION TO STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION

Identified as a long-term trend in the 2017 national defence and security strategic review and then in the 2021 strategic update, the renewed phenomenon of strategic competition is now being seen at both a global and a regional level, in configurations that expose us more obviously and are becoming more widespread. Revisionist ambitions have intensified, giving rise to numerous displays of naked opportunism from the eastern Mediterranean to the Sahel and the Pacific. We are consequently moving from latent competition to open confrontation on the part of Russia and, increasingly, to greater competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The pandemic, the climate crisis, the migration crises and the return of a high-intensity war on European soil remind us of the far-reaching interdependence between the domestic and international arenas, in terms of politics, economics, energy and food. These crises illustrate how the fracturing of the world order can restrict our freedom to act. The 2022 national strategic review is therefore consistent with and complementary to the European Union’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept, which were adopted this year. It aims to apply these strategies while incorporating our own specific features.

The challenging and circumventing of the international order based on multilateralism and the rule of law, whether seen at the United Nations or in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the reactivation of territorial disputes, are becoming more commonplace and diverse, following in the footsteps of past breaches (Helsinki principles, INF and Open Skies treaties, Budapest Memorandum, etc.). The body of agreements and laws built since the end of the Cold War is crumbling and, although the causes are not recent, this phenomenon has accelerated sharply since 2014. By way of illustration, out of the agreements that until recently maintained equilibrium in the Euro-Atlantic area, only the New START Treaty remains; furthermore, it is due to expire in 2026 with no clear successor. Bypassed and hollowed out if not denounced head-on, this arms control architecture is now both more necessary and more weakened than at any time in almost forty years.

1.2 THE MAIN AREAS OF ANTAGONISM IN BRIEF

Russia: assumed revisionist ambitions

Russia is pursuing a strategy that seeks to undermine European security, of which the war against Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, is the most open and brutal manifestation. In implementing its ambition for power, conceived as opposition to what Russia calls “the collective West”, Moscow had for a long time preferred a more indirect approach, focusing on undermining the West on a politico-diplomatic level, such as information warfare and political interference, types of action where the perpetrator is difficult to pinpoint, seeking to divide transatlantic allies, etc. Without having disappeared, this strategy is now accompanied by the desire to engage in direct military confrontation, as shown by the war of aggression against Ukraine. Rewriting history and its national narrative, the Russian government is increasingly open about its imperial ambitions based on its view of the balance of power.

The future of Russian military power after this test will be an important issue for the Atlantic Alliance and Europe over the coming decades, as the strategic concept adopted at the Madrid summit and the Strategic Compass adopted under the French presidency of the Council of the EU (FPEU) emphatically underline. Regardless of the outcome of the war, it will have seriously debilitated the human and material potential of the Russian forces. The need to regenerate this potential will come up against the effects of sanctions on the Russian economy and the defence technological and industrial base (DTIB), but it is expected to continue to be financed to a large extent. The weakening of its conventional forces over the long term could lead Moscow to...
prioritise more indirect modes of confrontation while boosting the role of its non-conventional weapons in its strategy.

19) The split caused by the war and the irreversibility of Russia’s strategy choices makes it necessary to anticipate confrontation with Moscow based on the trio of competition, dispute and confrontation, taking place over a long period of time, in multiple regions and spaces. This move towards confrontation is already taking place in Africa, through offensive diplomatic manoeuvres combined with anti-Western information-based attacks and the use of mercenaries. Moscow sees in this globalised hybrid war substantial leverage in external theatres and in environments where new types of action are now being taken. Thus, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Baltic area, the Balkans, and the North Atlantic, plus Africa and the Middle East, all offer the possibility of prolonged confrontation and the risk of incidents that could potentially escalate.

People’s Republic of China: affirmation

20) In addition to staying in power, the goal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is still to supplant the United States as the world’s leading power. Considering American power and the Western model to be in decline, the Chinese regime believes that Western leadership of the international order has weakened and that it can weaken it further by wielding its new influence. The CCP is therefore banking on the majority of non-Western countries standing back from the war in Ukraine to fuel a discourse that portrays opposition based on “the West against the rest”. However, beyond ideology and the war in Ukraine, China’s challenge is permeating other areas, be they political (propaganda about the decline of the West), economic and technological (predation, trade war), military (growth of the nuclear arsenal, modernisation of the PLA, offering support abroad) or diplomatic (a more assertive attitude in international forums, use of bilateral balances of power or alternative multilateral formats, such as the 14+1 or the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) in nature.

21) The modernisation of China’s military apparatus continues, enabling the PLA to support an increasingly assertive strategy, including on the military front, whether in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly with regard to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, or in other regions of the world where Chinese diplomacy is gaining traction, especially in Africa. The political nature of the PLA and the civil-military integration being deployed in the fields of technology, the economy and indeed information are serving up wide-ranging hybrid actions not seen before. These actions are limitless in practice and at this stage, constrained only by the PRC’s decision to challenge the edifice of international security from the inside.

22) The growing strategic convergence between the PRC and Russia opens up the prospect of greater dispute within international bodies, directed against the expression of Western objectives and offering opportunities for political alignment against the West, and the United States in particular. Their shared desire to set aside or mute their differences in order to challenge Western influence, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine, is giving rise to some kind of occasional cooperation. This situation is primarily visible in the diplomatic arena and in information warfare. On a structural level, the imbalance in Chinese-Russian relations in favour of Beijing is set to grow with the Ukrainian crisis. The political, strategic and technological implications for global governance could be enormous.

23) Examining, over time, Western cohesion and the impact of sanctions against and embargoes on Russia will also give the PRC a valuable insight into the scope of economic coercion methods that could be used against it in a major crisis.
1.3 DEMOCRACIES BECOMING CONTESTED AND WEAKENED IN THE BATTLE FOR INFLUENCE

24) Against a backdrop of increasingly intense strategic competition and confrontation, the position of liberal democracies has been weakened because they are defending an international order whose foundations (international law, multilateralism, values, etc.) are being openly challenged by several States. This dynamic is sustained by resentment towards political legacies, sometimes colonial in nature, and perceptions of unfair development, which dovetail with the growth in authoritarianism and illiberal regimes around the world. These circumstances make it more difficult to appreciate the changing environment in which we operate and to anticipate crises.

25) This situation can be seen in terms of influence and perceptions. Russian and Chinese operations in these areas seek to undermine our own political systems and national cohesion, while fuelling or even creating alignments against us, as the war in Ukraine demonstrates. Our opponents are counting on successfully discrediting Western discourse based on humanist values, and asymmetry in the relationship with the law and respect for international humanitarian law.

26) Our competitors are using the law as a weapon against our interests to ensure their own ascendancy. Part of a hybrid strategy, the strategic use of laws (or “lawfare”) can be broken down into three major areas: the growing use by certain States of their own laws as instruments of power, in particular through extraterritoriality; the use, misuse or circumventing of international laws; and the exploitation of legal and judicial vulnerabilities resulting from our domestic laws or European commitments.

27) Finally, Western States must take into account the inevitability of technological catch-up and spread, which are now taking place. This form of technological equalisation helps to make numbers important again. By sometimes taking a more agile approach and by dint of sheer weight of numbers, our strategic competitors have the capacity to tip the regional balance, such as Iran in ballistics. At the same time, multilateral regimes that fight against dissemination have become less effective, undermined from the inside by Russia in most cases. GAFAM\(^1\), and other private-sector firms, are emerging as non-State players whose active or passive contribution must be included as input data once the challenge phase is underway.

1.4 CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RETURN OF NUCLEAR REALITY, HIGH INTENSITY AND HYBRIDITY

28) One key initial lesson from the war in Ukraine is the threat of nuclear escalation and the casual approach to this by a nuclear weapons State. Combined with the collapse of arms control architecture and lingering proliferation crises, Russia's use of nuclear rhetoric as an offensive (not defensive) device in support of the invasion of Ukraine has the potential to undermine strategic equilibrium and, in the longer term, to intensify proliferation. A successful coercive manoeuvre backed by nuclear weapons would set a dangerous precedent. Russian intimidation and threats of coercion under the shadow of nuclear weapons also undermine the efforts of the P5 States in the area of policy transparency.

29) This next-generation war waged by Russia features a return to a full-on strategy combining far-reaching hybrid actions and in-depth high-intensity operations. The lessons from this major engagement under the aggressor's nuclear umbrella underline the importance of flawless coordination across multiple ministries and armed forces, known as multi-environment and multi-field manoeuvres, as well as the need for joint action on a large scale in terms of both mass and density. They also remind us of the need to create an international approach to strategic competition, allowing us to signal our determination, and to prevent and channel the

\(^1\) GAFAM is the acronym for the web giants Google (Alphabet), Apple, Facebook (Meta), Amazon and Microsoft, the five major US firms that dominate the global digital market.
escalation options of competitors operating under different constraints and in different registers from our own.

30) Nuclear multipolarity, relatively contained until now, could take a more deregulated form. This is due, in particular, to the undermining of international frameworks and security guarantees, and of the previously established expansion pathways of nuclear powers, and the emboldening of regional players. Firstly, the greater quantity and quality of China’s nuclear arsenal, combined with Russia’s actions, could jeopardise further efforts to preserve nuclear arms control agreements governing the arsenals of the main nuclear-weapon States. Secondly, looking beyond the cases of North Korea and Iran, the non-proliferation regime could come under renewed pressure. The proliferation of weapon delivery systems (ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, etc.), tougher military postures and the development of denial-of-access capabilities will provide many regional powers with greater capacity to cause harm.

31) Hybrid strategies have shown their impact on multiple theatres. Their effects continue to spread in Africa, the central and eastern Mediterranean, and the Indo-Pacific region. These strategies exploit the difficulty for Western States to provide an effective response that is compatible with respect for the political commitments, treaties and principles that underpin the international order. Using a variety of levers, such strategies are adapted to the interests of the players following them, enabling these players to affect France’s interests at the lowest possible cost, in mainland France and its overseas territories, and also elsewhere. Common spaces (cyber, space, seabed and air-sea spaces) are now the subject of renewed competition for power. Actions that have already been taken in these spaces reflect the adoption by all States of an approach that is applied to these spaces across the full trio of competition, dispute and confrontation. Their operational and geographic importance is growing while the shared rules governing them are insufficient, weakened or contested.

32) Within hybrid strategies, States are increasingly systematically using cyber as a weapon to defend their strategic interests or in the context of geopolitical tension. In addition to the development of offensive capabilities, sophisticated off-the-shelf, cyber-espionage weapons and tools are gradually being developed by private companies. This cyber-arms race increases the risk of escalation, the stages of which are not equally understood. Lastly, cybercrime, a threat that has reached unprecedented levels of sophistication and is running rampant, constitutes a strategic challenge for our national security.

1.5 CRISIS EPICENTRES AND REGIONAL OPPORTUNISM

33) The United States’ refocusing on strategic competition with the PRC is accompanied by a shake-up in the balance of power between regional powers. In the Middle East, the diplomatic and military emboldening of certain regional powers is concomitant with the destabilisation of already fragile countries. The persistence of proliferation crises (Iran, North Korea, Syria in the case of chemical weapons) helps fuel these sources of regional destabilisation. These dynamics affect our strategic interests because there is a simultaneous rearrangement of intra-regional agreements, alliances and relative power. Distrust of the West and the laws it promotes underpins Russia’s and the PRC’s policies of influence in Africa and the Middle East. Within Europe itself, the Western Balkans are likely to be an area of fragility in the short term which Russia and the PRC could seek to exploit to divide and weaken Europe.

34) The international jihadist movement will continue to spread and pose a security challenge for the next decade, both for the West and for the fragile countries of the Muslim world, from Africa to Southeast Asia. Exploiting favourable conditions (poor governance, endemic corruption, lack of social justice, strategic competition), it will help fuel crisis trouble spots and destabilisation in the Levant, North Africa, the Sahel and West Africa, for which a military response, in support of local partners, will continue to be sought.
35) The war in Ukraine is also a reminder of how regional crises and global challenges can interact and reinforce each other. Energy has once again become a key issue and a geostrategic lever. The potentially changing geography of energy producers and supply routes fuels energy-related rivalries that redraw the balance of power. The strategic nature of energy flows complicates the challenges of resource management as many terminals and pipelines (both gas and oil) are located in areas experiencing tension. Similarly, the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have highlighted the importance of food as a lever of influence and coercion for certain regimes. Food security has re-emerged as imperative to domestic political stability for many States. Acceleration in the effects of global warming, possibly coupled with a global food crisis, will intensify migration, whether manipulated or otherwise, and create new epicentres of tension, likely to adversely affect both Western cohesion and individual countries. France’s overseas territories will be increasingly exposed to the security consequences of these underlying trends (increased predation, more violent and destructive natural disasters, migration pressure, etc.), which may require a greater commitment from our armed forces.

36) The war in Ukraine also threatens a return to State terrorism. It can be assumed that given Russia’s unrestrained actions, weapons of all kinds can be sourced from the Ukrainian theatre to serve proxy or terrorist groups. These weapons could be used against our interests, alongside a disinformation campaign.

2. STRATEGIC SOLIDARITY FACING THE TEST OF CONFRONTATION

37) Acceleration in the risk of conflict and rapid expansion in fields of confrontation confirm the need for strategic alliances and the principle of solidarity that shapes them. This strategic solidarity must be assessed according to whether France is the beneficiary, the sole provider or one component of many in this solidarity, whether within the EU, NATO or ad-hoc coalitions, for example against Daesh or in the Sahel-Saharan strip.

38) Deterioration in the international environment, the risk of opportunistic strategies as our interests become more stretched, and the diversity of areas of action highlight the immense difficulty for France to respond alone to all the challenges it faces (Eastern and Northern Europe, Mediterranean-Red Sea, Middle East, Indo-Pacific, Africa, Arctic, etc.). The robustness of our partnerships, the maintenance of a high level of interoperability with the United States, and our ability to build permanent or temporary strategic alignments in a changing environment will more surely shape our global influence and impact as regards the development of a more stable environment. They will also allow us to anticipate - and thus prevent - potential side effects of competition, or even rivalry, between allies.

2.1 EUROPE AT A CROSSROADS ON THE WAY TO BECOMING A STRATEGIC PLAYER

39) A great deal of progress has been made in recent years in the field of European defence, both in terms of capability - creation of the European Defence Fund (EDF), implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), strengthening of the European Capability Development Plan - as well as operationally with the creation of the European Peace Facility, and socially with the handling of migratory crises.

40) The adoption of an ambitious Strategic Compass in March 2022 was a first step, symbolising a shared desire to strengthen coherence in defining and pursuing our strategic objectives. Implementing the Compass will be key to strengthening the Union's capacity to act by 2030, in particular in the operational arena and in contested strategic spaces. Furthermore, the lifting of Denmark's opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a positive signal.

41) The development of a real politico-military action capability for Europe in its immediate environment remains an objective. In terms of capabilities, the decisions taken at the Versailles
summit (10 and 11 March 2022) have made it possible to launch a new effort, which must be pursued with all European partners. A great deal of work will have to be done to continue to develop a common strategic culture, which is essential if European-level defence is to emerge. The joint declaration of 21 September 2021 on a European strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the adaptation of the European maritime system in the north-west Indian Ocean have the long-term objective of establishing the EU as a credible player and provider of maritime safety and security to States in the region. This dynamic is already at work in the Arabian Gulf (EMASoH/AGENOR) and the Eastern Mediterranean (QUAD MEDOR).

42) Closer cooperation between the EU and NATO will be essential to further strengthen European strategic autonomy and the transatlantic relationship.

43) Lastly, our Europe-wide cooperation efforts have been intensified, by focusing on a wider range of partners with which large-scale sector-based cooperation has begun, whether in terms of capabilities, operations or through the establishment of strategic partnerships.

2.2 AN ATLANTIC ALLIANCE STRENGTHENED BY THE SITUATION

44) NATO is still the foundation and essential framework for Europe's collective security. The majority of our European partners have been sharply reminded that this is the case by the return of war to Europe and the open and lasting confrontation with Russia, as shown by Finland's and Sweden's applications for membership.

45) This period started in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and continued conflict in the Donbass, tangible signals of growing Russian military aggression, which forced NATO to make a major effort to adapt. This collective awareness has been reflected in increased investment, with a third of NATO allies having defence budgets at or over 2% of GDP. This significant effort must be continued under a ramping-up of collective power against opponents unapologetically pursuing their own interests. The benefits of these developments are that they bring our European partners closer to our view that we must collectively take more responsibility for defence.

2.3 THE AMERICAN PIVOT

46) For the United States, the PRC is the long-term strategic priority, with a fundamental shift starting in 2007. This focus permeates many areas of US policy, relations with traditional allies and its positioning in multilateral forums.

47) Washington is perceived as being in search of a formula that will allow it to reduce its involvement in regional theatres that it now considers secondary (Africa, Middle East), while strengthening the security of its partners. This objective involves, for example, an effort to promote more integrated Middle Eastern partners (Abraham Accords) and to formalise ad hoc agreements around energy, political and military projects (e.g. Pacific Islands Forum). This repositioning is already prompting States in the region to invest in managing their own security.

48) Through the war in Ukraine, the United States has again emerged as the main source of European security, through the scale of its reassurance efforts and military support to Ukraine. A potential weakening of US investment in areas of European interest (Africa, Middle East), which are furthermore exposed to the unilateral aims of mid-sized powers and the rise of anti-Western views, could affect our ability to make a lasting contribution to the security and stability of these regions.
2.4 OUR PARTNERSHIPS TO BE REINVENTED

49) France, a balancing power, refuses to be locked into bloc geopolitics. This has always been France’s position and it is important it is maintained in the search for a balanced relationship with our allies. France has a long history of establishing strategic partnerships in its areas of interest, in which our partners must find security, stability and development.

50) In Africa, we face major security and humanitarian challenges. The terrorist threat remains high in the Sahel-Saharan strip and is spreading towards the Gulf of Guinea. Russian actors, including the private military company Wagner, are carrying out actions that are contrary to our interests, and at the same time their involvement is resulting in a worsening security situation, the predation of economic resources, numerous abuses documented by the UN and the ever greater fragility of the States that resort to them. The PRC has a stranglehold on infrastructure, the economy and debt, creating risks of not only of dependency for our partners, but also espionage and restrictions on our operating environment.

51) With the Latin American and Indo-Pacific regions, France can strengthen its cooperation and consolidate the relationships between our overseas departments, regions and communities and their immediate environment.

52) The ability of certain competitors to propose alternative models, most often posited as transactions and less governed by normative concerns, also has an impact, particularly on States under political, economic or food pressure.
Part Two

Challenges to be met
53) France’s interests include all factors that contribute to its security, prosperity and influence. In particular, a distinction should be made between:
- protection of the national territory, including France’s overseas territories, and of French nationals against external threats and attempts at internal destabilisation, including the terrorist threat;
- security of EU Member States and the Euro-Atlantic area under the treaties by which we are bound;
- stability of neighbouring countries, given the immediate repercussions that any crisis emerging there would have on our own territory, as regards both metropolitan France and overseas;
- freedom of access to common spaces (cyber, space, seabed, air-sea spaces, and the poles), which is now threatened by challenges to the rules-based international order and by might-is-right approaches.

54) Defending these interests is now more complex because force and intimidation are being used more systematically by some of our strategic competitors, and because of an international context that has been permanently damaged by the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

55) France’s main lever for defending its interests remains the long-term maintenance of its autonomy of decision-making and sovereign action in response to all threats that arise. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the world’s seventh largest economy controlling the second largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ), a nuclear-weapon State, and a founding member and driver of European integration, France has some crucial tools to assert its interests on the international stage.

56) However, the increasing number of constraints on our interests makes it more necessary than ever to have robust and sustainable means of action available, adapted to recent world developments. Our defence capability contributes to this on several levels, as the basis of our independence and freedom of action in the world in the face of threats of all kinds.

57) In this respect, the policies defined in 2013 and 2017 remain fully valid and their tangible implementation must be continued and accelerated.

58) They establish that the defence of our security interests is built on three pillars, i.e. the strengthening of our strategic autonomy; attaining European sovereignty and consolidation of our alliances; and the preservation of a stable international order based on respect for the law and multilateralism.

59) In any event, ultimate responsibility rests with the President of the Republic to constantly assess the nature of our interests and the attacks that could be made on them.
1. **France’s Security Priorities**

1.1 **Strengthening Our Strategic Autonomy**

60) Strategic autonomy is a prerequisite for protecting our fundamental interests. At its core are the capacities for autonomous assessment, decision-making and action.

61) Our freedom to act and the protection of our fundamental interests are ensured first and foremost by the credibility of nuclear deterrence, the keystone of our defence strategy. The fundamental aim of deterrence is to prevent a major war that would threaten the survival of the nation by protecting France against any state-sponsored aggression against its vital interests and against any attempt at blackmail. In a more uncertain and complex world, where some countries are on a worrying trajectory of opacity plus rapid growth of their nuclear arsenals, or even raising the spectre of using nuclear weapons for intimidation or blackmail, maintaining the credibility of our deterrent over the long term remains essential.

62) Our autonomy also depends on strengthening a credible, coherent and balanced armed forces model. This requires conventional forces whose size and equipment allow for a conventional-nuclear coordination that is sufficiently robust to preserve the President’s freedom of action and avoid deterrence being bypassed from below.

63) Strategic autonomy is also based on other factors: national cohesion, economic and industrial independence, security of our supplies, and international influence, including through strong diplomatic efforts.

1.2 **Attaining European Sovereignty and Consolidating Our Alliances**

64) The protection and promotion of our fundamental interests cannot be limited to the national level. We must continue to contribute actively to the defence of European interests and our collective security. These objectives require the strengthening of our international cooperation, partnerships and alliances, first and foremost within the EU and NATO, where we are bound by certain security guarantees (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 42-7 of the EU Treaty). Investing in existing or future ad hoc partnerships will also allow us to forge common responses to certain challenges according to specific geographies.

65) Beyond these commitments, our interests must be seen in light of the growing interweaving of the interests of European States, united in a common destiny. The return of might-is-right philosophies and war to the European continent illustrates the importance of continuing and deepening integration among Europeans in order to foster:

- the development of a common strategic culture in all fields (extension of the work undertaken in the 2022 strategic plan);
- Europeans’ ability to defend their security interests against potential aggression, in particular in their immediate vicinity, including through the development of common defence capabilities allowing for greater interoperability;
- joint European action in support of the international order based on law and multilateral management of global issues (United Nations, non-proliferation regimes, etc.);
- the affirmation of the EU as a geopolitical actor.
1.3 THE DEFENCE OF A STABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON THE RULE OF LAW AND MULTILATERALISM

66) In addition to our commitments to our EU partners and NATO allies, our interests must also take into account the States in our vicinity and those to which we are linked by partnerships or defence agreements. This concerns areas of the world where States are engaging in increasingly aggressive strategic competition, and where non-State groups could be in a position to directly threaten our nationals.

67) As a balancing power, France has a duty to contribute to the stability and security of these regions. The fact some French territory is located in these areas requires us to maintain our presence in all areas and gives us a particular legitimacy to act.

2. EXPANSION OF STRATEGIC FUNCTIONS

68) The relevance of the various strategic functions to which the armed forces contribute, identified in the 2008 White Paper, has been confirmed as the strategic environment has evolved. They cover knowledge-appreciation-anticipation, deterrence, protection-resilience, prevention, intervention, and now influence.

69) Influence, in all its dimensions - diplomatic, military, economic, cultural, sporting, linguistic, informational - is a highly-disputed area, which requires a coordinated response. It is a new strategic function in its own right.

70) Proper coordination of these functions contributes to an integrated approach aimed at responding to the evolving continuum of threats posed by our adversaries to our interests and values and those of our closest partners. In this respect, they remain dependent on our ability to ensure proper coordination at both European and multilateral level.

2.1 KNOWLEDGE – APPRECIATION – ANTICIPATION

71) The knowledge-appreciation-anticipation function feeds into all the other strategic functions. Maintaining an autonomous assessment capacity is a guarantee of sovereign-decision making. It contributes directly to appreciating the intentions of our competitors. While being a condition for the operational effectiveness of the forces, it contributes to the economy of the resources used.

72) The five areas of this function are intelligence, knowledge of theatres of operation, diplomacy, foresight and anticipation, and information management. The recent crises and upheavals as well as the extension of conflicts to new areas justify strengthening this function.

73) Effort should focus on understanding phenomena to anticipate and facilitate responsiveness in decision-making. Faced with not only the pace of crises' development and escalation, but also saturation by irrelevant information or information manipulated by our competitors, our collective effectiveness increasingly depends on the ability to filter, prioritise and circulate intelligence as quickly as possible, in order to appreciate the phenomena it is describing.

74) The knowledge-appreciation-anticipation function has a strong partnership dimension. To retain autonomous assessment of the situation on priority issues, France must also make use of its partners' assessments in addition to its own resources.
2.2 **DETERRENCE**

75) Nuclear deterrence depends on its political, operational and technical credibility. To be solid, this credibility must continue to be based on a deep-rooted strategic culture, dynamic and cutting-edge scientific research, technical and operational know-how kept constantly up-to-date, unshakeable industrial sovereignty, and understanding of the issues by our fellow citizens.

76) The purpose of nuclear deterrence is to protect us from any State aggression against our vital interests, wherever it comes from and whatever form it takes, and it remains the ultimate guarantee of the Nation's security, protection and independence. It ensures our autonomy of decision and freedom to act in respect of our international responsibilities at all times, including against attempts to blackmail us in the event of a crisis. Its existence contributes to the security of the Atlantic Alliance and of Europe.

77) Deterrent assets are being renewed, while being maintained at a strictly sufficient level. They must remain suited to a wide variety of situations and continue to offer the Head of State a sufficiently wide range of ways to take action. To this end, deterrence will continue to make use of airborne and seaborne components. Bringing together three nuclear forces with their own characteristics, they offer, by virtue of their complementary natures and the different benefits they possess, a wide range of options and a high level of flexibility and responsiveness.

2.3 **PROTECTION – RESILIENCE**

78) The implementation of a strategic function dedicated to protection-resilience is now essential. The notions of protection and resilience complement each other, with resilience being an indispensable prerequisite to ensure the protection of the French people and territory, and guarantee the continuity of the Nation's essential functions. This function requires enhanced cooperation with our allies and partners.

79) This protection function primarily concerns metropolitan and overseas France, as well as areas where French communities are numerous or highly exposed abroad. This geographical dimension alone is no longer sufficient to protect all the Nation's vulnerabilities, given the dependence of our economy on strategic supplies and energy flows, together with the hybrid strategies developed by France's strategic competitors. The protection-resilience function must also include the new roles brought about by the consequences of climate change and deteriorating biodiversity: food as a weapon, power and self-sufficiency, the protection and security of value chains, assistance to our populations, keeping territories and EEZs secure, taking chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats into account, information manipulation, etc.

80) All State institutions contribute to the implementation of this function. For their part, the armed forces are permanently engaged on a daily basis in protecting national territory and the French people within the framework of their State action missions at sea or in the air, on domestic missions and their own military operations. They provide permanent air and maritime security readiness postures, which guarantee national sovereignty in air and maritime spaces, and help secure supply and communication routes. These day-to-day measures are reinforced according to particular threats or events. The resurgence of hostile behaviour near our territories requires robust means of detection, remediation and response, including in space and in cyberspace. The capabilities of the armed forces thus need to be strengthened and structured as part of the overall State effort to deal with large-scale crises.

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2 The Strategic Oceanic Force, the Strategic Air Force, and the Nuclear Naval Aviation Force.
2.4 PREVENTION

81) Prevention concerns both the national territory and France's action outside its borders. Implementation includes both the development of national and international standards, and the fight against arms trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, for disarmament and peace-building. Supporting the stabilisation of States in crisis contributes to conflict prevention and limits the cost of further intervention. The prevention function is based on a wide range of potential crisis or escalation scenarios, covering the top end of the spectrum and competition between major powers, and the signs of rapidly changing conflict.

82) Advance positioning of military forces plays a key role in the prevention function, as it does for other strategic functions. The presence of French military forces in third countries, in agreement with them, contributes directly to this objective.

83) The security and defence cooperation mechanism is an indirect lever for preventing future crises. Such cooperation takes the form of assistance to allied partner forces to provide them with the capabilities to assert their own sovereignty.

84) The prevention function must be coordinated with the intervention function. This articulation is embodied in the capacity to signify determination, clarify intentions and discourage opponents - including in terms of perceptions - to "win the war before the war".

2.5 INTERVENTION

85) The intervention function serves three purposes: to ensure the protection of our nationals abroad; to defend our priority interests and those of our partners and allies; and to live up to our international responsibilities.

86) It gives France's security the necessary strategic depth, but also the broader credibility it needs to ensure the reliability of its alliances and its ability to act as a prime mover in coalitions, as a framework nation. While French armed forces retain a capacity to act alone, their engagement outside France is usually as part of a collective action.

87) In addition to the resources necessary for the protection of national territory, the armed forces possess the capacity to engage in areas deemed a priority for the defence and security of France: the European periphery, the area from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, part of Africa - from the Sahel to equatorial Africa -, the Arabian Gulf and the Indo-Pacific. France must now resolve the issue of the strategic reach of its forces, and therefore the use of fulcrums to which the pre-positioned forces, the overseas sovereignty forces and its strategic partnerships are attached.

88) The intervention function cannot be separated from the other functions, especially in a high-intensity engagement. Whether it is the knowledge-appreciation-anticipation function (anticipating and assessing threats to allow a wide range of options), prevention (the intelligence value of our active deployments), protection-resilience (securing our supply chains) or deterrence (the concept of mutual support between conventional readiness and nuclear deterrence), the intervention function translates into multi-location and multi-field actions.
2.6 INFLUENCE

89) The strategic function of influence aims to promote and defend the interests and values of France. This is an essential part of the expression of power. In this respect, France has many assets. It is a major political voice owing to its seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), its status as a nuclear-weapon State and its overseas presence, its full range of armed forces and troops deployed on many continents, its economic attractiveness, the French language spoken by 300 million people, a positive image because of our cultural influence, global projection supported by its comprehensive diplomatic, cultural and educational network, our security partnerships, etc.

90) The new dimension given to the influence function acknowledges an acceleration and toughening of stances in competition and disputes in all fields, particularly in terms of perceptions. The aggressiveness shown by our competitors reminds us that nothing can be taken for granted: in addition to our diplomatic, economic and strategic interests, the new battles for influence are over our ability to keep the French and European model alive, and to ensure that France's involvement on the international stage is understood and accepted. We therefore need to assume the balance of power more directly in this field to defend the national interest.

91) Influence is first and foremost part of a long-term strategy. A global policy conducted and coordinated at the interministerial level, it relies on capacities that support and legitimise our stances and actions, which must be deployed in all possible fields (training of foreign military personnel and coordination of networks, contribution to university research, aid to economic development, etc.). It also requires knowledge of the levers of influence deployed by our partners, competitors and adversaries.

92) Inseparable from the other strategic functions described in this review, the influence function must be embodied in a national influence strategy.

93) Following on from the 2021 Roadmap for Influence, this national strategy will set the general framework for action by all the actors concerned, determine the intentions and provide guidance for the national sectoral and/or geographical strategies.

94) This strategy will aim to:
- defend France's long-term interests as well as universal values, the application of international law, multilateralism and the preservation of common goods;
- promote and showcase its commitments in all areas;
- respond or retaliate to manoeuvres or to attacks against our interests, particularly in the information field.

3. IMPACTS OF THE RECENT CONTEXT ON FRANCE’S SECURITY INTERESTS

95) The return of high-intensity conflict including on European territory, the increasingly unrestrained expression of desire for power coming from our strategic competitors, and the weakening of international regulatory frameworks, all constrain our choices and pose an unprecedented risk to France's priority security interests.
The attacks on our strategic autonomy are increasing. Our strategic competitors seek to make use of our dependencies, and to undermine our sovereign judgement and national cohesion in order to shape our appreciation of situations and constrain our decisions.

The attainment of European sovereignty is essential to the defence of our interests, particularly in this period marked by a tendency towards insularity that is deeply affecting the major players in the international community. Our partnerships and alliances are both one of France’s main assets on the international stage and one of the targets favoured by our strategic competitors to weaken us. The Covid-19 pandemic and then Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine have demonstrated the central role of our partnerships and alliances in developing a common appreciation of the challenges and providing appropriate responses. The Strategic Compass for the European Union and the update of NATO’s Strategic Concept have set out clear roadmaps, which must now be implemented.

The defence of a stable international order, based on the rule of law and multilateralism, has underpinned our security and prosperity since 1945. The activism of revisionist powers and the project they are promoting, centred on the balance of power and the fait accompli, are not acceptable: our security interests demand that the continuity of our strategic supplies, our freedom of action in the common spaces and our sovereignty in the digital space are all ensured, together with an ambitious commitment to arms control and non-proliferation. These objectives must be based on collective rules that are in fact followed.
General aims for 2030

99) France affirms its aim of being a balancing power on the international stage by 2030, having strengthened its reach and influence in its areas of interest. It aims to be a driving force for European strategic autonomy in a Europe capable of handling crises and implementing solutions that guarantee its own security, in particular through a credible European defence that complements the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, it fulfils its security responsibilities by aiming to preserve effective multilateral mechanisms based on international law.

100) This strategic ambition must be deployed through the prism of the fracturing of the world order, highlighted in particular by the war in Ukraine. These circumstances call into question the current French armed forces model, which was designed on a mainly expeditionary basis. By 2030, the model will have to provide France with the capacity to deal with the need for increased prevention and influence, a possible return to high-intensity inter-State conflict, and the hybrid strategies deployed by our competitors.

101) By 2030, France:

• will be able to defend both metropolitan France and its overseas territories, and to protect and involve its citizens. This permanent objective is based on an independent, credible and coherent nuclear deterrent, the cornerstone of our defence policy, supported by robust conventional armed forces. Permanent security readiness adapted to threats and involving the internal security forces, and a dynamic national resilience strategy, also contribute to this;

• will contribute to the defence of Europe and to stability in the Mediterranean by having the capability to engage in high-intensity conflict. It will be able to assume the role of a framework nation within a NATO, EU or ad hoc coalition;

• will act within balanced partnerships, providing security, in an area stretching from sub-Saharan Africa to the Arabian Gulf, via the Horn of Africa. Together with its allies, it will offer its partner armies a diversified and orchestrated range of courses and training. From a network of suitable support bases, it will retain a capacity to intervene or provide support as part of a coalition;

• will contribute through its influence and with its partners to the stability of the Indo-Pacific area. It will defend its sovereignty and respect for international law within that area;

• will ensure its freedom to act in common spaces (cyber, space, seabed and air-sea) and the security of its supply routes, together with its partners.

102) To achieve this, France has set itself ten strategic objectives:

• a robust and credible nuclear deterrent;

• a united and resilient France;

• an economy contributing to a defence mindset;

• first class cyber resilience;

• to be an exemplary ally in the Euro-Atlantic area;

• to be a driving force behind European strategic autonomy;
• to be a reliable sovereignty partner and a credible provider of security;
• guaranteed autonomy of assessment and decision-making sovereignty;
• the capacity to defend and act in hybrid fields;
• freedom of action and the capacity to conduct military operations, including high-intensity operations, autonomously or in a coalition, in all fields
Part Three

Ten strategic objectives
Strategic objective 1

A robust and credible nuclear deterrent

103) The effectiveness of French deterrence policy depends on its political, operational and technical credibility. This is reflected in a high state of readiness and long-term capability commitments, but also in the ability, which has been widely demonstrated from the outset, to adapt both policy and resources to the strategic context and its potential changes.

104) France's deterrence policy must therefore take into account the global trends unfolding as regards both technology and hybrid forms of conflict. Firstly, our competitors' expanding capability (air and missile defences, space, hypervelocity weapons, underwater surveillance, etc.) must constantly inform our thinking on deterrence; and secondly, the ways hybrid actions, already at work in peacetime, operate are likely to affect the environment - political, normative, informational, etc. - within which deterrence is exercised and the most effective means of countering them need to be under constant consideration.

1. THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF THE FRENCH DETERRENT

105) The conflict in Ukraine reveals the essential role our nuclear forces play in the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. It demonstrates the need to maintain a robust and credible nuclear deterrent to prevent a major war, guarantee France's freedom of action and defend its vital interests, which have a European dimension.

2. MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE, INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN DETERRENT

106) In such circumstances, it is crucial to maintain a credible deterrent, i.e. one that is legitimate, effective and independent, for the period to 2030 and beyond.

107) Working to preserve the legitimacy of deterrence means redoubling efforts to bolster strategic culture and deterrence, both nationally and within the EU and the Alliance, by enabling a wider public to understand deterrence issues.

108) At the same time, in accordance with the principle of maintaining a strictly sufficient level only, France will continue to act in favour of arms control, non-proliferation and strategic risk reduction.

109) France has chosen to continue efforts to renew both its components, and to ensure that the armed forces model makes sufficiently robust mutual support possible between nuclear and conventional forces to preserve the French President's freedom of action and avoid deterrence being by-passed from below. The war in Ukraine confirms the need to maintain a capacity to understand and constrain the risk of escalation. In addition, building national resilience to all threats will strengthen deterrence.

110) Finally, the long-term independence of the French deterrent must be ensured through greater monitoring of fundamental and applied research teams and the national industrial fabric linked
to the deterrent, and through consolidation of the technical, industrial and operational expertise that is indispensable to that deterrent.
Strategic objective 2
A united and resilient France

111) France must strengthen its resilience in the face of all the security challenges it is likely to face, whether military or non-traditional (information manipulation, climate change, resource predation, pandemics, etc.). This effort needs to be made in metropolitan and overseas France, particularly by promoting a defence mindset and ensuring national cohesion.

1. STRENGTHENING FRANCE’S CAPACITY FOR RESILIENCE, COLLECTIVELY AND IN DEPTH

112) France is implementing its national resilience strategy (NRS). This aims to strengthen its ability to withstand any kind of attack on the normal life of the country. It enables precise and efficient coordination with a number of other mechanisms with similar objectives pursued by both the EU and NATO.

113) The NRS defines three fundamental objectives: to fully prepare the State for crises; to develop human resources and material capabilities to deal with them, by including a comprehensive study on the question of strategic stocks and diversification of supply sources; and to adapt public communication to cover the challenges of resilience. This strategy must now be extended to local and regional authorities, companies, non-profit organisations and the general public.

2. PROMOTING A SUSTAINABLE DEFENCE MINDSET IN SOCIETY AND THE STATE

114) Individual morale, especially in young people, underpins collective resilience. It should be strengthened in education, to increase the skills that strengthen society’s resilience (transmission of republican values, first aid, etc.). Part of the interministerial dynamic, the armed forces help to both promote remembrance and instil a defence mindset in young people. The ministries concerned will strive to support the ramping up of universal national service (UNS) with the aim of further fuelling France’s resilience. Finally, a comprehensive overhaul of the military reserve system will be undertaken beyond the National Guard (internal armed and security forces).

115) The attractiveness of military professions must be improved, by supporting and compensating for the constraints of military life to consolidate the defence mindset, forged as early as possible in education, with some practical and rewarding schemes.

116) The unique position of the military, essential to enable the armed forces to prepare and ensure the defence of France and the higher interests of the Nation, must be protected, including from increasing normative pressure.
3. DEVELOPING SYNERGY BETWEEN THE MINISTRY FOR THE ARMED FORCES AND ALL STATE SERVICES

117) The prospect of a major crisis or even a high-intensity confrontation involving France makes it necessary to raise the level of ambition in terms of national resilience, in particular by developing a better understanding of mutual resilience between the armed forces and the Nation.

118) The armed forces are able to help deal with any major crisis with a great responsiveness as part of a strengthened civil-military dialogue. The general structure of Operation Sentinel must be redesigned to guarantee the armed forces have freedom to act while responding to new security challenges. The Operational Defence of the Territory (ODT) concept will also be overhauled.

119) The entire nation’s involvement must be strengthened by increasing public officials’ awareness of national defence and security issues, continuous training of those involved in crisis management, consolidation of the senior defence and security officials (SDSO) network, and a commitment from all ministries to support armed forces engaged in a high-intensity conflict.

120) This synergy between a population imbued with a defence mindset and officials experienced in planning and crisis management will make it possible to strengthen national resilience in the fields of security, the economy, employment and social cohesion.
Strategic objective 3

An economy contributing to a defence mindset

121) Setting up an economy that contributes to a defence mindset requires knowing how to mobilise all the Nation's resources in order to shift to a war footing, i.e. to organise itself so that French industry can support a war effort in the long term, to meet the needs of the armed forces or for the benefit of a partner.

1. SECURING CRITICAL SUPPLIES AND MATCHING STOCKS TO PRODUCTION CAPACITY

122) To sustain a war effort over the long term (high consumption of ammunition, attrition, etc.) the best compromise is to be sought by acting on three main levers: the constitution of strategic stocks (finished equipment but also raw materials and critical components); relocation of the most sensitive production lines; and diversification of supplies.

123) In addition, joint stocks of components or raw materials could be set up on the initiative and under the responsibility of industry to support military industrial activities in the event of a conflict, or civilian activities in the event of an economic or health crisis. The development of recycling channels should also contribute to a circular economy, reducing the need for supply and contributing to sustainable development.

124) Securing the supply of critical resources could benefit from European initiatives such as the RePowerEU action plan and its offshoots for raw materials (Critical Raw Materials Act) and on components (Chips Act), while respecting French sovereign interests and environmental requirements.

125) In order to ensure it fulfils its primordial duties, the State must be able to impose priorities or requisitions on the national market, depending on how the conflict is progressing.

126) Since security stability is a prerequisite for our society's long-term future, the DTIB must be able to benefit from favourable financing, including as regards the development of sustainable finance. Consequently, future standards on taxonomy or environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria should not discourage investment in defence industry companies.

127) Finally, the health crisis and the Ukrainian conflict have shown the importance of having secure and redundant sources of supply. The relocation of production and recycling facilities onto European and French territory must consequently be encouraged and supported to remedy the most critical dependence on materials, components, etc. This is being thoroughly examined as part of the work on the war economy.
2. **Reducing Production and Support Cycles for Gradually Gearing Up to a “War Economy”**

128) In addition to acquiring, over the next few years, the most critical equipment needed to respond to a high-intensity conflict, or that susceptible to rapid attrition, a war economy preparation plan is being developed in order to adapt the DTIB to the different geopolitical contexts in a gradual and adjustable manner.

129) EU and NATO defence capabilities should also reflect some consideration of these geopolitical circumstances.

3. **Streamlining Regulatory, Normative, Procurement and Support Processes with a View to Risk Management**

130) The increasing and proactive use of innovation and value analysis in the work between the Defence Procurement Agency and the armed forces must result in the forces being equipped with the most appropriate solutions, while taking an acceptable risk in use and achieving the best balance between operational, financial and time savings.
In the face of strategic developments, the focus must be on improving our cyber resilience. The resource does not exist that would create a cyber shield that would defeat any cyber attack against France, but raising the level of cybersecurity is essential to prepare the country for more threats. Similarly, using a deterrent approach in cyberspace that would force any attacker to exercise restraint against France is fanciful, but adopting response strategies that galvanise all the options the State has available, both European and international, means cyber attacks can be made particularly costly for attackers.

This cyber resilience consists in having tailored and organised capabilities, that can prevent or, if they happen, reduce the impact and duration of cyber attacks against France, at least for the most critical functions.

1. Improving France’s cyber resilience, a prerequisite for sovereignty

The efforts undertaken in the public and private sectors must be amplified. Notwithstanding the important work already begun, the State's cybersecurity shows significant room for improvement. Large-scale attacks are still plausible in some critical sectors, even though the investments made under the France Relance recovery plan have considerably improved the level of cybersecurity. Meanwhile, the systemic role of certain digital players is still insufficiently taken into account.

2. Consolidating the achievements of the French model

The fundamental achievements of the French model, established in 2008 and regularly strengthened and adapted, need to be consolidated. Governance over the State's digital security has been overhauled and can now be deployed. The Nation's ability to devise and implement public policies is illustrated by the creation of regional incident response teams (CSIRT), the opening of the Cyber Campus and the emergence of a cyber defence ecosystem in Rennes. Lastly, following its presidency of the Council of the European Union, France is recognised by its peers as setting an example on cybersecurity issues. The challenge now is to ensure that the EU directives for mass cybersecurity adopted under the FPEU are implemented as soon as possible.

3. Investing over the long term to reach the highest level of cyber resilience

The cybersecurity level of all public services needs to be raised significantly. This will necessarily involve investment to consolidate a homogeneous and secure digital base for the State, and to strengthen institutions and government departments that are still too vulnerable.

France's action must be increased by making use of a dynamic public- and private-sector cyber ecosystem. The State cannot act alone on cybersecurity issues and must be able to get all stakeholders involved in the event of a major crisis. Particular attention will be paid to
prevention and providing assistance to all victims of cyber attacks. Finally, this ecosystem must be based on a competitive domestic and European cyber defence industry.

137) All stakeholders in the digital world must be trained and made aware of cyber risk. The aim is to get the general public involved, systematically integrate cyber risk into educational curricula and make working in the sector more attractive. Efforts must also be made to ensure the accountability of digital service providers and the security of supply chains, particularly that of the State. Lastly, France can support and encourage the emergence of trustworthy, robust, sovereign bids at both domestic and European levels.

138) France's resilience depends on that of its European and international partners and on the security and stability of cyberspace as a whole. It is therefore necessary to help raise the resilience level of European and international institutions and of France's partners, and to continue building a European market for cybersecurity products and services. On the international stage, France must put forward proposals to control the trade in cyber weapons and fight against their proliferation, including through better use of export control schemes for goods and technologies. In addition, a common standard for cyber crisis management, together with cooperation and mutual assistance mechanisms, would enable States to avoid the risks of misunderstanding and uncontrolled escalation.
Strategic objective 5

France as an exemplary ally in the Euro-Atlantic area

139) NATO is a political and military alliance that plays a key role in European security through its main role of collective defence and, in particular, the mutual assistance clause in Article 5 of the 1949 Treaty. The transatlantic link remains essential to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and consequently that of France.

1. HELPING TO INCREASE THE ALLIANCE’S OPERATIONAL ADDED VALUE

140) France will continue to contribute fully to all the missions of the Atlantic Alliance, fulfilling its role within military structures and operations, as it is doing in the war in Ukraine and in the Baltic States and Romania. It will contribute to their ability to respond and adapt.

141) France wishes to confirm the Alliance’s key role in the defence of Europe. NATO strengthens the potential of armed forces and is the forum for addressing interoperability challenges as well as capability, technological and operational requirements.

2. ENHANCING FRANCE’S UNIQUE, KEY ROLE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

142) France intends to maintain a unique position within the Alliance. It adopts a demanding and clear position because it follows its own specific and independent defence policy, owing in particular to its nuclear deterrent. On the strength of its operational credibility, its unique ability to act urgently at a high level and its financial contribution, which is among the largest in the Alliance, France intends to strengthen its own and the European allies’ influence and bring that to bear on major changes in NATO’s readiness and the future of strategic stability in Europe.

143) Mindful of the coherence and cohesion of the Alliance, France will continue to contribute in a proactive, realistic and sustainable way to strengthening the posture on the eastern flank - including as a framework nation - and to the adaptation of NATO’s command structure.

3. DRIVING EU-NATO COOPERATION

144) France is working to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance in a pragmatic approach to its role, which rules out an extension to other geographical areas and in particular the Indo-Pacific. The guarantee provided by NATO’s collective defence commitment remains the central pillar of security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

145) Defence investment, in line with the 2014 Wales Summit commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence, must continue to increase in Europe. This level should be seen as a floor as regards dealing with the strategic disruption caused by the war in Ukraine and the capabilities needed by the European allies to ensure their security.
This collective effort also entails the creation, at EU level, of the necessary incentives for cooperation between European states on capabilities and manufacturing. These help to strengthen Europe's resilience, essential not only for the Alliance's effectiveness but also for the sustainability of a robust, agile European DTIB (EDTIB) capable of meeting European armed forces' operational needs.

France supports the modernisation, widening and deepening of the EU-NATO partnership, to take account of the new security challenges facing Europe and the forthcoming accession of Finland and Sweden.
Strategic objective 6

France as a driving force behind European strategic autonomy

148) France and all European countries share the same security challenges. The adoption of an ambitious Strategic Compass in March 2022 and the major role played by the EU since the start of the war in Ukraine demonstrate both the power of our leverage and how much we still have to do. A sovereign Europe needs to emerge, endowed with a common strategic culture, and with an ability to make assessments and take autonomous action to serve the shared interests of Europeans.

1. COMING TOGETHER AROUND A EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

149) France plays a key role in strengthening European sovereignty, notably through its membership of three key bodies in the EU, NATO and the UNSC.

150) France is first of all working towards a convergence of views in assessing situations between Europeans, all of whom have different strategic cultures or political priorities.

151) France next supports the renewal of the European partnership policy that was initiated with the adoption of the Strategic Compass. It goes hand-in-hand with strengthening the EU's defence relationships with countries in Africa and the Indo-Pacific and, in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, with the implementation of balanced relations supported by regular and intensive defence and security dialogues. The EU and NATO should seek a more complementary relationship, sustainable over the long term. France must play a leading role in this, promoting closer cooperation in certain key areas, such as military mobility, cyber and hybrid threats.

152) As a final point, EU cohesion in its support for Ukraine is a priority. It is imperative that Europeans remain united and proactive, both on sanctions and in support of the Ukrainian armed and security forces. A continued high level of military assistance over time through the provision of equipment and appropriate training is crucial. Consistency in this matter is needed if Europe is to remain capable of influencing the resolution of the conflict.

2. BRINGING EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY CAPABILITIES TO THE FORE

153) The EU must continue on the path towards greater technological autonomy which goes hand-in-hand with the development of the European defence industry.

154) European strategic autonomy depends on robust European defence industry capabilities that meet its own needs. France supports setting up a short-term instrument for joint acquisition of European hardware. It also supports the creation of a defence investment programme for joint development and procurement of critical and innovative military equipment. The central role of the European Defence Agency (EDA) must be reaffirmed and all existing mechanisms put to use: the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Hub for European Defence Innovation (HEDI). In addition, provisions relating to social taxonomy must take into account the specific
features and needs of the EDTIB, which is a central component of European strategic autonomy.

These efforts must be accompanied by decisive structural progress in common capacity-building projects with the objective of an independent EDTIB and common decisions among Europeans.

3. STRENGTHENING THE EU’S AND EUROPEANS’ OWN CAPACITY TO ACT

Europe must be supported in its role as a global player, a credible defender of free access to contested spaces (sea, space, cyber, air, seabed) in the face of its competitors’ hybrid strategies. With the right strategies and capabilities, it is able to protect Member States’ citizens, interact and, where necessary, intervene worldwide in strict compliance with the law.

The EU’s normative power must be exploited as a lever of influence in a more competitive environment, in order to guard against hybrid threats and other forms of foreign interference, be it lawfare, blackmail over raw materials, or information manipulation.

In this sense, France supports the instruments developed by the European institutions: hybrid toolbox, foreign information manipulation and interference - FIMI - toolbox, regulation against anti-economic coercion, etc.

France is contributing to the development of a genuine EU STRATCOM, capable of positioning Europe and European action in relation to its citizens, their representatives, our partners and also our competitors.

The EU must continue to build up its rapid deployment capability. It needs to be able to respond quickly and more robustly in less permissive environments. To this end, France is promoting more flexible decision-making with Article 44 of the Treaty on European Union and renewed decision-making and command and control (C2) structures, as well as global mandates to act across a broad spectrum: advice, training, equipment, and combat support. The EU must be able to initiate ad-hoc operations when necessary, as France has done previously with Takuba or EMASoH.

France, given its geographical position, industrial and military capabilities and domestic expertise, contributes actively to the development of European airspace protection. Its nuclear deterrence is part of this.

Lastly, the European Intervention Initiative (EII) is the crucible for a common strategic culture and enhanced cooperation between its members. Launched in 2018, this initiative remains entirely relevant today to support Europeans taking increasing responsibility for their own security, resulting in operational commitments in which France can play the role of framework nation.
Strategic objective 7

France as a reliable sovereignty partner and credible provider of security

163) France upholds an ambitious strategic policy that translates into clear-sighted, balanced and prioritised ties of solidarity with its partners. In a context of intensified polarisation and competition, France's policy towards its partners must continue to stand out by virtue of its high added value, and enable France not to be forced into alignment or marginalisation.

1. asserting its role as a clear-headed partner offering high added value

1.1 developing an inclusive strategy in europe and with the us

164) In Europe, France must both recast its relations with its traditional partners and develop an inclusive strategy towards other countries:

- with Germany, France must deepen its relationship in order to continue to build European defence in the light of Germany's recently expressed aims and the strategic and capability needs we have identified;
- Italy and Spain are key partners, both in theatres of operation (Mediterranean, Middle East, Sahel) and in terms of cooperation on capabilities;
- with EU members, France must consolidate several of its strategic partnerships (Greece, Croatia) and capabilities partnerships (Belgium) concluded recently, consolidate its links with certain partners (Quirinal Treaty with Italy, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain), and strengthen its operational cooperation on the basis of shared experiences in the Sahel and in Eastern Europe (countries involved in Operation Barkhane and the Takuba task force);
- with partners in the EU neighbourhood (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia), France should contribute to their stability by capitalising on its economic aid and European programmes to support structural reforms;
- with our allies, our space partnerships will be intensified;
- post-Brexit, constructive dialogue on the basis of bilateral treaties must be quickly re-established with the UK.

165) With the United States, our strategic partnership will remain fundamental, and must remain ambitious, clear-sighted and pragmatic.

1.2 contributing to security in africa through balanced partnerships

166) Faced with the changing terrorist threat and the growing influence of our strategic competitors across the continent, France intends to forge renewed partnerships in Africa in response to requests from African partners, incorporating more civilian-based cooperation along a security, defence, diplomacy and development continuum, as it stated in the summer of 2017. These partnerships should contribute to a better understanding of security issues and build, in the
long term, a stronger strategic proximity with African armed forces that wish to do so, particularly in view of the renegotiation of several major treaties. Coordination with our European and international partners will continue to be essential in this regard.

1.3 ADOPTING AN AMBITIOUS PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE RED SEA

167) Given the increased competition and militarisation in the Mediterranean-Red Sea continuum, France needs to strengthen its reassurance measures, support EU and NATO missions and operations, and enhance the effectiveness and level of capability cooperation with all countries in the region. A denser network of strategic and key partnerships will also enable France to guarantee its freedom of manoeuvre, the continuity of its supply chains and regional stability.

1.4 CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURING FLOWS IN THE ARABIAN GULF

168) A revitalisation of France's partnerships in the Gulf is necessary to cope with the new strategic agreement landscape, American disengagement and the increase in regional rivalries. France must be able, with and through its partners, to hinder and counter the destabilising activities of certain actors in the region, and to secure its own footprint, in particular by signing security agreements in the fields of counter-terrorism, intelligence and armaments. France must also continue to support defence and security equipment procurement projects while strengthening the fight against the misappropriation of military hardware, the spread of conventional weapons and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

1.5 ENHANCING OUR ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

169) France's role as a balancing power in the Indo-Pacific must be reaffirmed. To this end, France is committed to building partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region, notably India, Australia and Japan, as well as Indonesia and Singapore. It is developing its capacity in strategic anticipation and intelligence, relative to its competitors, and confirming and bolstering its position in the region's politico-military multilateralism by increasing its training capacity and, if necessary, encouraging the emergence of ad-hoc structures. France will also promote implementation of the EU's strategy for the region and its partnership with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

2. PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE, THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE SPREAD OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

170) France protects the centrality and credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the sustainability of the four multilateral export control regimes covering chemical and biological, nuclear, ballistic and conventional weapons.

171) It is continuing to invest in the intelligence needed to hinder illicit or destabilising traffic, with a particular focus on intangibles, which are particularly vulnerable to cyber actions, while developing countermeasures to CBRN threats in order to promote resilience in the face of possible attacks against its forces, interests or territory. It is also boosting its ability to act to counteract such illicit or destabilising traffic.
Strategic objective 8

Guaranteed autonomy of assessment and decision-making sovereignty

172) In an increasingly competitive and complex international context, France must focus its efforts on raising its level of knowledge, its appreciation of competitors and adversaries, and anticipating their intentions. This performance requirement calls for increased agility in directing the focus of intelligence services while preserving the universality and effectiveness of the diplomatic and consular network. It also requires continued investment in technological capabilities to exploit the ever-expanding volume of data, in order to share relevant information with decision-makers and action-takers in a timely manner.

1. DEVELOPING AGILE INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES

173) Intelligence services have to monitor, analyse and understand a growing number of geographical areas and issues. They must anticipate crises, technological and military capability disruptions, the terrorist threat, the CBRN threat, the defence and promotion of national economic and industrial interests, including DTIB companies, and the fight against hybrid and transversal threats. One decisive issue is to coordinate their continued action in the fight against terrorism and in support of military operations with reinvestment in areas of strategic rivalry, in particular continental Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

174) The effectiveness and agility of the intelligence services depend on ambitious reforms, long-term investments and shorter coordination and intelligence exchange loops, including with the armed forces as regards operations. The continuation of the in-depth transformations already begun - in particular the General Directorate for External Security and the Directorate of Military Intelligence, following the example of the General Directorate for Internal Security - must be accompanied by an ambitious human resources policy in intelligence professions, to attract, retain and develop a common culture and inter-service mobility. It is also essential to ensure the universality of the diplomatic network and to strengthen its analysis and anticipation resources.

2. BUILDING TECHNICAL CAPACITY

175) Preserving French sovereignty in the face of technological change requires new investment in capabilities. The growing diversity of tools and the acceleration of technological advances offer new opportunities, provided that the necessary investments are made, with resources being pooled when missions so allow. The responsiveness of the knowledge-appreciation-anticipation function must be improved by increased interconnections across secure communication tools, ensuring technical interoperability with our main foreign partners on a case-by-case basis, particularly within the EU and NATO.

176) The new technical tools will have to use the potential offered by quantum computing and artificial intelligence.
Strategic objective 9

The capacity to defend and act in hybrid fields

177) France's main strategic competitors use hybrid strategies, deliberately ambiguous combinations of direct and indirect, military and non-military, legal and illegal, and often difficult-to-attribute means of action. Such strategies can have significant consequences for democracies, aiming to delegitimise them, weaken their moral authority and cohesion, or reduce their economic and national defence potential.

178) Faced with these threats and to defend its fundamental interests, France must improve its organisation, be in a position to respond to all fields of hybrid action, and protect its most critical infrastructure.

1. IMPROVING OUR ORGANISATION

179) France must be capable of countering and controlling the effects of these hybrid attacks, while respecting its principles and values. To this end, a more agile, responsive and integrated organisation will be adopted to identify and assess threats, trigger appropriate protection mechanisms and develop responses using a more multi-disciplinary approach. In line with the EU's Strategic Compass and the NATO 2030 concept, France is also making use of its allies and partners to benefit from leverage in its fight against hybrid threats.

180) This organisation is based on a national strategy of influence which must make the actions carried out part of a comprehensive, long-term approach not only to promote France's involvement but also to respond or retaliate effectively to information-based manoeuvres or attacks against its interests. It includes the involvement of public diplomacy, particularly in Africa. Strategic communication is developed to convey a coherent, credible and effective message to competitors, partners or allies and to domestic and international public opinion. It can be coordinated with allies.

2. TAKING ACTION

181) In the fight against information manipulation by foreign competitors, France must have a wide range of response options, beyond public denunciation of perpetrators, as happens with cyber attacks. France is fighting against the use of law and norms as a strategic tool (lawfare) by its competitors. It supports the adoption of Europe-wide toolkits to combat extraterritoriality. France is developing tools to fight back against private military companies, armed groups or militias used as intermediaries (or proxies) by hostile powers to expand their range of dispute or competition, all while maintaining plausible deniability. The circulation of information, domestic or European sanctions, legal proceedings or even military action could target these groups if they carry out activities detrimental to French interests, or if they are responsible for human rights violations and war crimes.
3. Strengthening the Protection of Critical Infrastructure

Protecting our critical infrastructure in the face of hybrid threats is a priority. Of these, underwater and space communication infrastructures require a special effort to develop the means to detect, assess, deter and even obstruct malicious actions. Lastly, France wishes to encourage the growth of leading-edge French manufacturers, world leaders in the field of submarine communication cables and space operations.
Strategic objective 10

Freedom of action and the capacity to conduct military operations, including high-intensity operations in all fields (multi-environment and multi-field)

183) The forces’ freedom to act depends on the ability to anticipate, detect and assess the intentions of France’s adversaries. It underpins the national capacity to show determination, discourage hostile action or prevent the imposition of a fait accompli, and to engage in confrontation if necessary. It allows for the robust backing of nuclear forces.

184) It must be preserved from the time competition first arises, in an ever-wider spectrum, because the strategies of France’s competitors and adversaries are expressed in a growing number of fields (space and cyber, the seabed, across electromagnetic and information fields).

185) France must maintain and further develop its capacities to decide and command, to unite and mobilise, to take long-term action, to occupy shared spaces and deal with unrestrained competitors, taking into account its own interests, its place on the international stage and overall objectives, and also its resources. These capacities necessarily differ according to the geographical areas and shared spaces in question.

1. Decision-making and issuing commands

186) France enjoys an autonomous capacity for assessment and appreciation of the fullest kind, as required to support political and military decisions. The armed forces have trained and deployable command capabilities to plan, conduct and control multi-environment and multi-field operations, in isolation or in a coalition when France is a framework nation at the operational level. A permanent and agile reorganised command structure controls the day-to-day and contingency operations that help safeguard its strategic interests, its metropolitan and overseas territories, its airspace, air and sea and aeronautical approaches, and its energy supplies.

2. uniting and contributing

187) In Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, France is able to mobilise or support its partners’ actions, so as to constrain or discourage an aggressor by offering command and support capability to armed forces. It honours its commitments in this respect.

188) In the Pacific zone, France has the resources available, in coordination with its partners, to discourage or hinder a competitor.
In Central and South America, the Arctic and Antarctic, it protects its own freedom to act, and the security of its movements and interests.

The armed forces are constantly working to develop and maintain interoperability with allies and partners.

3. TAKING LONG-TERM ACTION

The armed forces protect the French people against a dangerous world, contribute to their daily protection, and help to safeguard national interests. In particular, they are in permanent readiness in terms of deterrence, air safety and maritime protection and take part in assignments on French territory (including French overseas territories with sovereignty forces), in addition to or in support of internal security or civilian security forces.

The armed forces are prepared for a major engagement and ready to engage in high-intensity confrontation, particularly in defence of the Euro-Atlantic area. They are able to deploy at short notice and be capable of first entry, with or without support from allied countries. They have the capabilities to protect themselves, persevere and cope with high attrition (air and firepower superiority). They are able to provide an allied country with the necessary support at short notice.

They possess a variety of capability options for deep strikes whether the situation is one of first entry, support to a coalition operation, retaliatory actions, or strategic warning. France is able to target and strike (kinetic or cyber weapons) objectives of interest.

The armed forces have the capacity to generate and aggregate effects in a networked approach from the time competition first arises across the entire spectrum of conflict, in particular with military and civilian, public and private, institutional and individual, national or allied contributions.

4. OCCUPYING SHARED SPACES

France is fully present and active in preserving its freedom of action and defending its interests in shared spaces that are subject to power rivalries and renewed forms of conflict.

Faced with strategic competitors, the armed forces acquire and retain their freedom to assess and act in cyberspace.

In space, France maintains its national strategic autonomy in terms of situation assessment, decision-making and the conduct of operations. It ensures its access to the space environment and the assertion of its interests in this environment, notably through the support of its partners.

France has the capacity to autonomously monitor and assess actions on the seabed. Using partnerships, it is able to discourage hostile action.

5. DEALING WITH UNRESTRAINED COMPETITORS

The armed forces have the protective, warning and coercive resources to influence the strategic calculations of France's competitors and adversaries and to win hearts and minds.
List of acronyms, names of operations and abbreviations
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGENOR</td>
<td>EU maritime operation to monitor the Strait of Hormuz</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUKUS</td>
<td>Abbreviation for <em>Australia, United Kingdom, United States</em>, a tripartite military partnership formed by those three countries</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and control</td>
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<td>CARD</td>
<td>Coordinated Annual Review on Defence</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>CSIRT</td>
<td>Computer Security Incident Response Team</td>
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<td>DGA</td>
<td>France’s defence procurement agency</td>
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<td>DGSE</td>
<td>France’s Directorate-General for External Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGSI</td>
<td>France’s Directorate-General for Internal Security</td>
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<td>DRM</td>
<td>Directorate of Military Intelligence</td>
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<td>DTIB</td>
<td>Defence technological and industrial base</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Defence Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EII</td>
<td>European Intervention Initiative</td>
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<td>EMASoH</td>
<td>European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FIMI</td>
<td>Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference</td>
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<td>FPCEU</td>
<td>French Presidency of the Council of the European Union</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>HEDI</td>
<td>Hub for European Defence Innovation</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty</td>
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<td>M2MC</td>
<td>Multi-location and multi-field</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NRS</td>
<td>National Resilience Strategy</td>
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<td>NT</td>
<td>National Territory</td>
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<td>ODT</td>
<td>Operational Defence of the Territory</td>
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<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</td>
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<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army (Chinese armed forces)</td>
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<td>PPSA</td>
<td>Permanent Air Security Readiness</td>
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<td>PPSM</td>
<td>Permanent Maritime Safeguard Posture</td>
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<td>QUAD MEDOR</td>
<td>Quadrilateral dialogue in the Eastern Mediterranean</td>
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<td>SDSO</td>
<td>Senior Defence and Security Official</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>Strategic Communication</td>
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<td>TPNW</td>
<td>Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNS</td>
<td>Universal National Service</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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