



RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE

*Liberté
Égalité
Fraternité*

NATIONAL STRATEGIC REVIEW 2025



1. The strategic backdrop in 2025

Since the beginning of the war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia has increased the number of hostile intimidation actions, cyber attacks, sabotage, spying, and information manipulation against France and its European partners. The Russian threat to our interests, and those of our allies and partners, is now unparalleled. **Between now and 2030, the main threat to France and European countries is now one of an open war targeting Europe**, involving major engagement by our armed forces outside of the national territory, which would be accompanied by a massive increase in hybrid attacks on our territories and against our interests in the world.



In this framework, NATO remains the only organization able to collectively respond to a major conflict on the continent. The American pivot to the Indo-Pacific region should nonetheless lead European countries to envisage this scenario with the possibility of significantly reduced US support. To do this, they must develop independent capacity for action and strengthen their sovereignty in all fields. France, the only Member State of the European Union that possesses nuclear weapons, has a specific role to play. It must be one of the key players in creating a European defence pillar within the Atlantic Alliance.

The National Strategic Review (RNS 2025) takes this backdrop into account: France and its European partners must be capable of better self-defence and able to deter Russia from carrying out another aggression on the continent.

The RNS 2025 also incorporates defence and security issues and challenges posed by other State actors.

In the Middle East, the security risk posed by **Iran** is the main strategic challenge for the region, but also for France and its European partners. The regional war that started on 7 October 2023 with the Hamas terrorist attacks, the direct clash between Israel and Iran and the absence of political settlement of the various crises, in particular the Israel-Palestine conflict, aggravates the permanent risk of a massive regional war that would directly affect our interests.



China has a clear objective to become the leading global power in 2049. The resulting rivalry with the United States is becoming tangible at the global level through Beijing's activism in the diplomatic, economic, military, technological and information fields.

The possible multiplication of crises theatres in the Indo-Pacific region forces France to maintain sufficient capacity for action to protect its interests (overseas populations and territories, partnerships). The development by **North Korea** of its nuclear weapons, with the probable technological support of Russia, contributes to this instability.

On the African continent, particularly in **sub-Saharan Africa**, the widespread competition between powers, predatory and destabilizing activities of Russia and other States, and the multiplication of local crisis hotbeds represent major threats for French and European interests.

The ties growing stronger between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea increase the risk of a proliferation of conflicts in the world.

The RNS 2025 presents a comprehensive, national approach to defence and security, one that mobilizes the whole State and involves all the Nation.




On the national territory, the return of the jihadi threat and the growth of organized crime (particularly drug trafficking) are factors of destabilization. Cyber crime attacks now affect all sections of society, such as hospitals, local governments, businesses and citizens. These threats can damage both the economy and national cohesion.

Violent protests of all forms are increasing, fostering sectarianism and insurgency, even separatist tendencies. Breaching the peace, sabotage and the destruction of property all affect public tranquillity and peace and undermine the authority and values of the Republic.

Meanwhile, the aggressive strategies of hybrid attacks by our competitors, which have multiplied since 2022, aim to weaken national cohesion and our social model.

The RNS 2025 identifies as key risk factors climate change, the collapse of biodiversity, difficulties accessing raw materials and their impact on economic and energy challenges.



In the face of these risks and threats, it is essential to strengthen France's resilience and the capacity to mobilize the entire Nation if needed. There must be a special effort made to raise awareness among young people on the issues of national defence and security.

Resilience is defined as a country's determination and aptitude to withstand the consequences of an attack or major catastrophe, and to rapidly restore its capacity to function. It requires not only public authorities but all of society.



2. An updated ambition for 2030

In the RNS 2025, France declares its ambition to be physically and morally equipped in 2030 to take on and win, along with its allies and partners, a major high-intensity war in the centre of Europe. It will also be able to handle the consequences of destabilizing actions that will occur on the national territory.

To do this, thanks to its armed forces model and its sovereign capacity for action and influence, **France operates according to the four following priorities:**

I

Protecting and defending the mainland and overseas territories, the population and French nationals.

This action is based on:

- independent, credible and coherent nuclear deterrence, a keystone of France's defence policy, and robust conventional armed forces;
- a defence posture tailored to the threats, involving internal security forces, to ensure permanent protection of people, property, resources and the environment;



- enhanced economic, technological, scientific and industrial security, including at the European level, through simplified financial instruments and common programmes;
- mobilization at all levels of society, which is united, resilient and involved in defence.

Defending Europe, including through its nuclear deterrence.

II

In this framework, France has the capability to engage in a high-intensity war, if necessary, as a framework nation within a NATO or ad hoc coalition. It is also a matter of contributing to the stability of the European Union neighbourhood. As such, France encourages the integration process of Ukraine, Moldova and other candidate countries, and develops an ambitious agenda with countries in the southern Mediterranean region.

III

Ensuring its security, the defence of its interests and that of its non-European allies in the framework of renewed partnerships, in an area extending from the Gulf of Guinea to the Indian Ocean, and including the Horn of Africa.

IV

Contributing to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region, through strengthened presence in overseas departments, regions and communities, through projection operations from mainland France and with its partners. For this, France has a network of strengthened support points.

France works with its partners for the security of common spaces (cyber, space, seabed, airspace and marine areas, and polar regions) and supply routes, in particular towards overseas territories because of their strategic importance to national defence and security.

3. Eleven strategic objectives stem from this ambition

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The first strategic objective is to have **credible, independent and sovereign nuclear deterrence**, a keystone of our defence policy, to ensure the protection of our vital interests, the European dimension of which was reaffirmed by the President of the Republic. This credibility, which is political, operational and technical, is based on two nuclear components (air-based and sea-based), the renewal of which was decided on by the President of the Republic.

France aims to **ensure its resilience**, both on the mainland and in the overseas communities and territories. It must be able to simultaneously address internal crises such as pandemics, organized crime, riots, and terrorism, and hybrid actions by its adversaries on the national theatre. This also implies the capacity to contribute to the efforts of the armed forces in the event of major engagement outside the national territory. This second strategic objective involves the moral rearmament of the Nation by making citizens actors of

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
cohesion and resilience in the event of a major crisis. It concerns the entire Nation: public authorities, citizens, the economic world, local governments and associations.



3

The development of an **economy that is preparing for war** is the third strategic objective. It is a question of ensuring that the French economy and industrial and State capacities fulfil the needs of the armed forces and internal security forces to tackle a major extraterritorial war that would have consequences on the national territory. France's budgetary sustainability and financial sovereignty must therefore be strengthened, particularly by controlling public debt.

4



France maintains cyberspace resilience which means it is a **leading cyber power** for the long term. In addition to continuing prevention and protection efforts, the fourth objective involves

the implementation of strategies that should render cyber attacks particularly costly for the attackers.

5

The transatlantic relationship continues to be essential for European and French security. Thus, the fifth objective is that France **will play its role of reliable ally, for the benefit of Europe's defence**, particularly against Russia in the framework of a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance that is strengthened and rebalanced.



In line with this commitment, France has a sixth objective of contributing to a genuine **scaling-up of European defence capacities** in the areas of technology, capabilities, operations and in terms of European resilience, particularly regarding energy. Europe must be capable of defending its interests and its model independently if necessary.

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France must also **deepen and diversify its international cooperation programmes**. This means developing new partnerships in Africa, consolidating our engagement in the Middle East, contributing to the safety of common spaces and regional stability in the Mediterranean region and in the Red Sea, and strengthening cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The incorporation and role of the French overseas territories will be therefore enhanced in regional partnerships. Lastly, France will continue its actions to promote multilateralism.

France aims to focus its efforts to ensure it has **autonomy of assessment and decision-making sovereignty**. The eighth strategic objective requires strengthening State intelligence services and capacity for action. On national territory, intelligence services will play a full role in responding to threats that erode the Nation's resilience and cohesion. The strengthening of ministerial and interministerial foresight will also help prevent incidents when this is possible, and draw up plans in accordance with predictable scenarios. Lastly, France's strategic thinking will be enhanced and there will be greater inclusion of strategic research actors in national studies on defence and security.

8

Capacity for **action in the hybrid fields (cyber space, the information sphere, law and economy, military operations)** is the ninth strategic objective. Faced with these threats to its interests, France must



9

be able to compel its adversaries, and particularly Russia, and discourage them in the implementation of their hybrid strategies. The State's defensive organization and its response capabilities will be strengthened with this objective. They are essential to control escalation, in particular in these five priority fields of hybridity.

The tenth strategic objective is that France **must have the military capabilities to preserve its freedom of action and defend its interests in all circumstances.**

In this regard, the armed forces protect French nationals from external attacks and contribute to their protection in mainland France and overseas France. They are an illustration of credibility and determination to win the war before the war. They are capable of engaging and prevailing in a high-intensity confrontation that would involve the entire Nation. They are founded on a coherent model that can adapt faster than that of the adversary. France's rearmament effort, which started in 2017, must continue and accelerate looking ahead to 2030.

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In the face of the acceleration of scientific and technological developments and their widespread use by its competitors and adversaries, France must have **academic, scientific and technological excellence** that serves French and European sovereignty. This eleventh and final strategic objective is a major change to the update of the national strategic review.



Achieving the 2030 ambition in the context described will require an increase in budget to accelerate France's rearmament and firmly shift towards a more resilient Nation, prepared to confront a high-intensity war.



The complete 2025 National Strategic Review is available
on the SGDSN website.



**PREMIER
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