RRN: A complex and persistent information manipulation campaign

Technical report

19 July 2023
MARCH 2022: RRN, A KEY COMPONENT OF THE CAMPAIGN

The detected campaign is centred around the media RRN, created a few days after Russia invaded Ukraine.

RRN, an online media outlet linked to Russian websites

Creation of the RRN website

On 10 March 2022, the domain name russia[.]news[.]com (Reliable Russian News) was registered in Russia. RRN presents itself as an independent media outlet publishing “fact-checked information” mainly concerning the war in Ukraine.

Available in several languages, probably thanks to an automated translation software, RRN has developed an editorial line based on four main themes: (1) The alleged ineffectiveness of sanctions targeting Russia, which would above all negatively impact European States and/or their citizens; (2) The alleged Russophobia of Western States; (3) The barbaric acts allegedly committed by Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the neo-Nazi ideology that would predominate among Ukrainian leaders; (4) The negative effects on European States that would allegedly be generated by the hosting of Ukrainian refugees.

Since 15 March 2022, at least seven official Facebook pages of the Russian diplomatic network have shared URLs leading to the RRN website. This is notably the case of the Russian embassies in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Slovakia (see Annex 1).

Three months after its creation, RRN administrators sought to disseminate their links with Russia by changing the name of the media, which then became Reliable Recent News. On 6 June 2022, the domain name russia[.]world was registered, and russia[.]news[.]com was set up to redirect traffic to the new domain name. However, Cyrillic characters continued to appear in certain articles published on russia[.]world.

Links between RRN and the pro-Russian War on Fakes fact-checking platform

The first articles published on RRN website were identical copies of articles previously published on the fake Russian fact-checking website War on Fakes, launched a few hours after Russia invaded Ukraine.

Quickly identified for its role in legitimising the Russian “special military operation” and discrediting the Ukrainian State, War on Fakes has also been amplified by at least 65 official Facebook pages and 24 official Twitter accounts of the Russian diplomatic network (see Annex 2). Moreover, War on Fakes the administrator’s login page has been set up to redirect traffic to russia[.]news[.]com, thereby establishing a technical link between the two websites.

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1 Regarding the malicious nature of the actors responsible for the RRN campaign, domain names and URLs in this report have been demilitarized. VIGINUM advise taking all the precautions of use when accessing these resources.
2 French, English, German, Italian, Chinese, Spanish, Arabic.
3 Source: Crowdtangle.
4 War on Fakes is a fake fact-checking website publishing in multiple languages used by Russia to deny the accusations that Russia has committed war crimes since it invaded Ukraine.
The domain name waronfakes[,]com was registered on 1 March 2022 and was updated a year later by Timofey VASILIEV, a Russian citizen known for having worked for ANO Dialog. Dialog is an organization created in 2019 under the supervision of the Russian Presidential Administration and the Department of Information Technologies of Moscow city. In charge of a portion of the public relations and communication strategy of Moscow, ANO Dialog has been accused of conducting online propaganda activities on behalf of the Russian State.

Meta’s attribution of the campaign to two Russian companies

On 15 December 2022, Meta publicly attributed the RRN campaign to two Russian companies: “Structura National Technologies” (Struktura) and “Social Design Agency” (Agentstvo Sotsialnogo Proektirovania).

Created in 2009, Struktura is a company specialised in the development of IT tools. With more than 500 declared “experts and specialists” and five branches (in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Smolensk, Nizhny Novgorod and Krasnoyarsk), Struktura counts several Russian government institutions among its clients, such as the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Government of Moscow city, and the State Duma of the Federal Assembly (lower chamber of the Federal Assembly of Russia). On its website, now offline, Struktura proposed some 40 IT products, including 13 that were explicitly labelled as being developed for the Russian State. The company has notably designed a solution for “monitoring and analysing the informational space”, an “information security” solution and a product called “Information Security Portal for DIT”, an abbreviation of the Department of Information Technologies of Moscow, under whose supervision ANO Dialog was created.

Founded in 2017, ASP is a digital marketing company located in Moscow, notably working in “films and video production and editing” and in websites’ translation and creation. On the 24 clients’ list declared on the ASP website, 21 are also clients of Struktura, including Russian governmental institutions.
In addition to their customer’s list, Struktura and ASP are run by the same director, Ilya Andreevich GAMBASHIDZE, a famous “political technologist” (politeknolog) and former assistant to the Prefect of the Northern Administrative District of Moscow, Oleg MITVOL. After studying Sociology and Political Science, and specializing in Political and Electoral Systems in local governments, Ilya GAMBASHIDZE was adviser to Pyotr TOLSTOY, Deputy Speaker of the State Duma, whom he accompanied to a summit of the Council of Europe in 2017.

**JUNE–SEPTEMBER 2022: INCREASING NUMBER OF MANOEUVRES**

**avisindependent[.]eu**, a fake media outlet analysing the war in Ukraine

**Creation of the avisindependent[.]eu website**

In June 2022, VIGINUM identified a now-offline website affiliated with the RRN campaign, called *La France indépendante*, registered on 1 June 2022 under the domain name avisindependent[.]eu.

Presenting itself as a media outlet publishing “news and analyses on the war in Ukraine”, avisindependent[.]eu published content replicating narratives often employed by Russia such as the Eastern expansion of NATO seen as a threat to Russian interests or the alleged desire of Western States to erase Russian culture.

![Archive of La France indépendante main page](source: avisindependent[.]eu)

The Russia-hosted website avisindependent[.]eu, was registered by the company NetBuzz. The email address netbuzzproduction@gmail[.]com redirects towards the VK and Instagram accounts of Mikhail Andreevich CHEKOMASOV, co-founder of Hustle Media (ООО ХАСЛ МЕДИА), a company specialised in managing influencers on social media and blogs.

The phone number contact of Hustle Media was registered under the name “Micha Netbus”. Micha is short for Mikhail, which corroborates the hypothesis according to which Mikhail CHEKOMASOV would have registered the domain name of *La France Indépendante*. In addition, a photo of a conference access badge published on the VK account of Mikhail Andreevich CHEKOMASOV is further evidence of his ties to Netbuzz.

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12 Илья Андреевич ГАМБАШИДЗЕ, Tax identification number: 771401746456.
13 https://www.dissercat[.]com/content/osobennostirazvityiamaestnogosamoupravleniyaavrossiiskoifederatsiiv-kontekte-transform et https://cyberleninka[.]ru/article/n/osobennostiv-yavorovv-predstavitelnye-organyvlastik-mestnogosamoupravleniya-v-2005-g-1
16 https://www.listorg.com/company/11783729/
17 https://archive.is/e1uAH
In 2012, Mikhail CHEKOMASOV founded the company Palmira Trade18 (ООО ПАЛЬМИРА ТРЕЙД) together with Kirill Vitalievich KALASHNIKOV, who is also the head of the influencer management company Lideri Mnienii (ООО ЛИДЕРЫ МНЕНИЙ). This company, also known under the name IPTeam or Veul,19 has already been identified by the French news magazine Marianne20 for having tried to contact French influencers in order to ask them to publish pro-Russia content in the context of the war in Ukraine. Mikhail CHEKOMASOV is presented on the company’s website as a member of IPTeam’s management, just like Anton K. ERLBAUM, cofounder of Hustle Media, and Deputy Director of IPTeam.

In addition, the companies Hustle Media and Lideri Mnienii/IPTeam/Veul are located in the same buildings in Russia and in China.

Fake accounts posting pro-Russia and anti-Western satirical cartoons

To increase the visibility of avisindependent[.]eu, several social media accounts were created, mainly on Facebook and Twitter. In addition to reposting links to La France Indépendante website and to rrn[.]world, these accounts posted pro-Russian, anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian satirical cartoons.

One of the main accounts was called Milana KRYSTEL, a fictional person presented as a French citizen who opposed the war in Ukraine. Created on 21 June 2022, this avatar, mentioned by several accounts within the RRN campaign scheme, is at the origin of a petition entitled “No Weapons in Ukraine” published on change.org.

The cartoons posted on these social media accounts and on avisindependent[.]eu came from two main sources: memhouse[.]onlne and the Telegram channel @VoxCartoons.

Information found on memhouse[.]onlne

Created on 15 April 2022, memhouse[.]onlne presents itself as an image bank, sharing cartoons mainly about the war in Ukraine. Several cartoons published on accounts affiliated with the RRN campaign seemed to have come from this website.

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18 Tax identification number: 7715916740.
19 Tax identification number: 7725337100.
According to data from reg.ru,\textsuperscript{21} the domain memhouse[].online, which has since been removed, was registered by a Russian national living in Moscow, Andrey SHUBOCHKIN.

Information found on the Telegram channel @VoxCartoons

One of the main sources of cartoons published during the RRN campaign is the Telegram channel @VoxCartoons. Created on 2 April 2022, this channel publishes satirical cartoons mocking certain European leaders, accused of being used by the United States in their management of the conflict in Ukraine.

Satirical cartoons published on the @VoxCartoons channel had also been relayed by the Russian diplomatic network, especially on the Twitter account of the Embassy of Russia in France on 23 March 2022. It is important to note that this happened one week before the Telegram channel @VoxCartoons was created.

Creation of websites accusing Ukraine and Western States of war crimes

truemaps[].info, a website listing the children killed in the Donbas region

rrn[].world and several social media accounts affiliated with the RRN campaign published links to truemaps[].info. Created on 30 June 2022, this website shows an interactive map representing all the countries providing arms to Ukraine, including France, as well as a list of children who have allegedly been killed in the Donbas region because of the delivery of these weapons.

\textsuperscript{21} Reg.ru is a Russian company that registers domain names, and in particular is responsible for registering .ru and .рф. domain names.
An examination of the source code of the truemaps.info website revealed the presence of Cyrillic characters, suggesting the involvement of Russian speaking actors in its design.

tribunalukraine.info, a website on “the war crimes committed by the Ukrainian armed forces”

Registered on 5 October 2022, tribunalukraine.info presents itself as a website aiming to restore “the truth that the media are hiding from us”. It publishes articles and videos in five languages on the alleged “war crimes” committed by “Nazis in power” in Ukraine. According to the accounts sharing the URLs towards tribunalukraine.info, the website would be administrated by Germans.

“Open Opinion” Facebook accounts: the first cases of typosquatting

“Single-use” accounts

During May 2022, the RRN campaign was behind the creation of a group of Facebook accounts targeting French, German, Italian, Lithuanian, British and Ukrainian audiences.

Mainly called “Open Opinion”, these accounts used profile pictures that were either taken from a German media logo or from images generated by artificial intelligence. These accounts were “single-use” accounts (or burner accounts) used for one unique post.

In addition to posting cartoons from @VoxCartoons, the “Open Opinion” accounts shared, via sponsored content, links to articles published on the RRN media website, the petition created by Milana KRISTEL, as well as typosquatted domain names of European national media outlets, including the French media 20 Minutes.

Containing many spelling errors and incorrect syntax, as well as outrageous language, the typosquatted websites analysed by VIGINUM were used to disseminate manifestly inaccurate or misleading content in favour of Russian interests. Some of these articles were directly taken from RRN.

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22 German, English, Spanish, French and Russian.
24 “Typosquatting” is a technique consisting in registering domain names with deliberately misspelled names of well-known websites to deceive users.
Use of a first network of bots

The RRN campaign has also used bots on Facebook, which disseminated URLs of typosquatted articles in comments sections of Facebook pages of legitimate European media outlets. The Facebook page of the German-speaking Turkish media outlet, TRT Deutsch, was also targeted in this manner. The accounts involved had British-sounding names and used profile pictures mainly taken from VK accounts of Russian nationals.

The use of bots generated operational security errors. Thus, some bots published links comprising two different parts: in green, a URL redirecting to a fake article from Bild; in red, a URL redirecting to a Yandex cloud using R7-Office software\(^{25}\) in which “veul_sas” is mentioned, which could refer to the company Lidery Mnenii/IPTeam/Veul whose management team includes Mikhail CHEKOMASOV.

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\(^{25}\) Russian subsidiary of the Latvian company OnlyOffice.
newsroad[.]online, an infrastructure similar to RRN

Created on 6 April 2022, alongside rrn[.]world, newsroad[.]online publishes articles in German, French, Italian, English and Spanish. Newsroad published links to articles on typosquatted media outlets and shared cartoons from @VoxCartoons.

Newsroad website (source: newsroad[.]online)

To access fake articles of typosquatted domain names, the Newsroad administrators used urbbox[.]online, a URL shortener allowing to hide the destination URL. The enumeration of urbbox[.]online URLs using the login available on Newsroad made it possible to discover the redirects to typosquatted websites and to rrn[.]world.

Extract of URLs shortcuts using urbbox[.]online

Several URLs hidden behind urbbox[.]online also redirected to German, Italian, Latvian and French news websites specifically created as part of the campaign.26 These websites published RRN articles, some of which were written by avatars created as part of the campaign. These websites also had dedicated YouTube channels on which they posted controversial videos about European States’ handling of the conflict in Ukraine.

Site web weltereignisse365[.]de
Site web viedo-klij[.]lv
Site web libera-stampa[.]it

The same article was published on four websites in its translated version

26 Viedo-klij[.]lv, librelepresse[.]fr, weltereignisse365[.]de, libera-stampa[.]it.
The investigations conducted by VIGINUM on newsroad[.]online and urlbox[.]online once again allowed to identify Andrey SHUBOCHKIN as the registrant of these two domains.

FEBRUARY – JUNE 2023: A NEW PHASE IN THE CAMPAIGN

Increased use of social media and sponsored posts

Content sponsoring as part of the RRN campaign

To increase its visibility and bypass the moderation measures implemented by Meta, the RRN campaign paid for sponsored posts on Facebook. Since February 2023, more than 160 Facebook pages have been identified by VIGINUM, posting more than 600 sponsored content containing links to articles and websites linked to the campaign.27

These ads can only be seen by a highly targeted group of users, chosen by the page administrator. The published URLs, which seem ordinary, contains hidden redirects to websites affiliated with RRN, using the geofencing technique.28 Therefore, URLs contained within sponsored posts redirect to different content depending on the user location. For example, if a user logged with a French IP address clicks on a link posted on a Facebook ad targeting France, he will be redirected to the typosquatted website. If he is logged with a German IP adress, the redirect won’t work and a blank page will show.

This modus operandi establishes a boundary around targeted users and limits the ability of any third parties to map the infrastructure of the campaign. Moreover, there are at least two traffic redirects before reaching the targeted website, in order to hide the campaign infrastructure and to protect it over the long term. VIGINUM identified a server that had communicated with several domain names used in the traffic redirects.29

27 rrn[.]world; typosquatted website; ukraine-inc[.]info; tribunalukrainel[.]info; fake news websites in French
28 “Geofencing” is a targeted advertising practice that consists in defining geographic boundaries to target individuals who are in or entering a given geographic area.
29 IP of the 35[.]187.82.108. server Domain names: marvelgoodies[.]com, bighorn-advisors[.]com, gitver[.]com, raremotion[.]com.
Use of a second network of bots

Since the end of May 2023, VIGINUM has detected activity from a network of Twitter bots sharing links to websites involved in the RRN campaign in the reply field of tweets published by European media outlets and political figures. As it is the case with Facebook, shared URLs redirect three times before reaching the targeted website.

Cyrillic characters were identified in the redirects, suggesting the involvement of Russian or Russian-speaking individuals in this operation. In particular, a URL found in one of the tweets made it possible to detect Cyrillic characters in the source code of the related web page. Indeed, when displaying the code, VIGINUM identified a base64 script. After decoding the base64, VIGINUM identified the chain of Cyrillic characters, on which it was written: “// Здесь вы можете добавить свой собственный js код здесь”.

Extract of the source code of the associated page (source: http://dsqno[.]jbhylobi[.]website/0468d)

Decoded base64 (source: http://dsqno[.]jbhylobi[.]website/0468d)

30 http://dsqno[.]jbhylobi[.]website/0468d
31 In IT, base64 is a data encoding technique using 64 characters.
Pursuance of media typosquatting

Since February 2023, VIGINUM has noticed an increasing number of impersonations of major French and foreign media outlets32, in order to publish pro-Russian articles linked to the war in Ukraine (see Annex 3).

The appearance of typosquatted websites is in every way similar to that of the media outlets they are impersonating, the only difference being the visited URL. The domain names of typosquatted media outlets use the same source code as that of legitimate media outlets: most of the links on the legitimate website are downloaded on the typosquatted website, which lends it credibility in the eyes of unsuspecting users.

To date, VIGINUM has identified four French media outlets that have been imitated: *Le Parisien*, *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro* and *20 Minutes*33. For the most part not indexed by search engines, the articles hosted on these typosquatted websites can only be accessed from the URLs in the sponsored content posted on *Facebook* and *Twitter*. The investigations conducted by VIGINUM pointed to the existence of at least 49 fake articles in *Le Parisien*, seven in *20 Minutes*, one in *Le Monde* and one in *Le Figaro*, which was the last media outlet whose identity was impersonated as of 8 June 2023.

Impersonation of government websites

Since 29 May 2023, the RRN campaign has been using the typosquatting technique to impersonate French and German government websites in order to publish manifestly inaccurate or misleading content. The identity of the website of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs was imitated and used to publish a fake communiqué stating that a new security tax had been allegedly introduced on a large portion of French financial transactions to fund support for Ukraine.

The same operation was observed on the website of Germany's Ministry of the Interior, with the publication of a fake press release on the alleged obligation for German households to host Ukrainian refugees.

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32 Germany, United Arab Emirates, United States, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, United Kingdom, Ukraine.
33 leparisien[.]ltd, lemonde[.]ltd, lefigaro[.]me, 20minutes[.]com
Created on 11 March 2023, ukraine-inc.info is a website hosting a series of cartoons called “Ukraine Cocaine” targeting Volodymyr ZELENSKY. The Ukrainian President is presented as a cocaine addict manipulated by a freemason network, and constantly asking Western States for money to enrich himself. According to different accounts and websites publishing these videos, the videos were allegedly made by French nationals. Furthermore, the server associated with ukraine-inc.info is hosted in Russia.

Posted on 11 March 2023 by the RRN official Telegram channel, @reliaberecentnews, the anti-Zelensky cartoon went viral on a massive scale on 12 March 2023, when it has been published by @readovkanews, the eighth most followed channel in Russia with 1.68 million subscribers. It has been viewed more than 891,000 times. Afterwards, more than 30 other high-audience Telegram channels have also published the video on the morning of 12 March, particularly channels of the public media outlet Ukraina.ru or the FSB-linked media NewsFront. On Facebook, it was notably posted on the official pages of at least nine Russian Houses (Русский дом), institutions affiliated with the Rossotrudnichestvo agency of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In addition to be the destination of the URLs published in the sponsored content on Facebook, ukraine-inc.info shares technical similarities with tribunalkraine.info. The host servers of these two websites were configured in a similar way, leaving open port 3000 dedicated to the development of websites before putting them online.

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34 As a reminder, in August 2022, another cartoon series called “Stop Nazi Games” was attributed notably by the Russian diplomatic network to a French animation studio called “Barracudas”. In this cartoon series, the Ukrainian President, pictured as a puppet being controlled by a secret society, was sending his troops to attack the Donbas region and the blood of the victims was turned into gold.
35 https://t.me/readovkanews/54519/
36 Ukraina.ru is part of the Russian public media outlet Rossiya Segodnya holding, which also owns the Sputnik News agency and the press agency RIA Novosti.
37 t.me/ukraina_ru/137086, t.me/SolovievLive/163610, t.me/newsfrontnotes/34506. Other channels include @intelslava, @golosmordora, @svezhesti, @denazi_UA, @golosmordora, @neuessaursrussia and @OstakhkoNews.
38 The Russian Houses implicated include those of Ankara, Alexandria, Dar es Salaam, Kathmandu, Cairo, Mumbai, Ulaanbaatar, Rabat and Tel Aviv.
Creation of fake French-language news websites

On 24 February 2023, a year to the day after Russia invaded Ukraine, five websites presented as media outlets with news in French were registered and hosted on the same server. Using French-sounding names (La Virgule, Allons-y and Notre Pays), these websites publish news articles on French and European internal politics, in which they criticize the French government, particularly its handling of the pension reform. In the meantime, they include Russia’s recurrent talking points criticizing the effects of sanctions imposed by the European Union against Russia or the alleged bias of Western media outlets, accused of spreading false information to the detriment of Moscow.

Several elements make it possible to link these five websites to the RRN campaign. La Virgule was indeed the primary broadcaster of the first episode of “Ukraine Cocaine”. In an article entitled “Zelensky is on drugs”, La Virgule stated for the first time that the creators of the cartoon series were French. The content of this article was replicated in sponsored posts on Facebook. In addition, La Virgule was mentioned for the first time by RRN website, before it was even indexed by search engines. Moreover, certain articles of La Virgule shared URLs to franceeteu[], today, created on 24 February 2023 and hosted on the same server as lavirgule[]news.
One of the authors of the La Virgule article uses the pseudonym “nochemiamisanta”, also used on the allons-y[].social website. In the URL of certain articles published by Allons-y, there are the words “privet-mir”, which can be translated from Russian as “hello world”.

Several articles published on Allons-y also contain Cyrillic characters, which is probably the result of a bad automatic translation from Russian to French.

The analysis of websites hosted on the same server as laverigule[].news enabled the detection of two similar websites, also targeting a French-speaking audience: notrepays[][].today and candidat[][].news. Lastly, the configuration of error messages on allons-y[][].today and candidat[][].news reveals that they were very likely designed by Russian or Russian-speaking individuals.
ANNEX 1: RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC NETWORK OFFICIAL FACEBOOK PAGES INVOLVED IN THE AMPLIFICATION OF THE RRN WEBSITE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Followers</th>
<th>Date (GMT)</th>
<th>Interactions</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embassy of Russia in Bangladesh</td>
<td>57773</td>
<td>Jul 12 2022 05:01:09</td>
<td>206</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/1000648783754893/posts/431370720841300">https://www.facebook.com/1000648783754893/posts/431370720841300</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian House in Kolkata Gorky Sadan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mar 15 2022 14:45:50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/110146109301164/posts/487848618931264">https://www.facebook.com/110146109301164/posts/487848618931264</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX 2: FACEBOOK PAGES OF THE RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC NETWORK HAVING PUBLISHED A LINK TO THE WAR ON FAKES WEBSITE

- Ambasciata della Federazione Russa in Italia / Посольство России в Италии
- Russian Foreign Ministry - МИД России
- Russische Botschaft in Deutschland / Посольство России в Германии
- Russian Embassy in Indonesia
- Russian Embassy in Ethiopia - Посольство России в Эфиопии
- Russian Embassy in the Philippines
- Embajada de Rusia en Mexico
- Посольство России в Швеции - Russian Embassy in Sweden
- Посольство России в Эфиопии / Ambassade de Russie au Bénin et Togo / Посольство России в Бенине и Того
- Посольство России в Лаосе Russian Embassy in Laos
- Посольство России в Афганистане / Embassy of Russia in Afghanistan
- Посольство России в Республике Корея 주한러시아대사관
- Генеральное консульство России в Монреале
- Embassy of Russia to Malta
- Consulado General da Federação da Rússia no Rio de Janeiro
- Russian House in Colombo
- Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Ghana
- Посольство России в Казахстане - Embassy of Russia in Kazakhstan
- Посольство России в Бельгии / Ambassade de Russie en Belgique
- Russian Consulate General in Edinburgh
- Russian Embassy in Jamaica
- Embassy of the Russian Federation in Sri Lanka and to the Maldives
- Russian House Chennai
- Генеральное консульство РФ в Осаке
- Russian Delegation on Military Security and Arms Control
- Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Bahrain
- Russian Canada-Русская Канада
- Генеральное консульство России в Пусане
- Посольство России в Эквадоре
- Consular Section of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ireland
- Посольство России в Зимбабве / Russian Embassy in Zimbabwe
- Consulate General of Russia in Mumbai
- Представительство МИД России в Южно-Сахалинске
- Embassy of Russia in Botswana
- Russian Consulate General in Jeddah
- Генконсульство России в Харбине
- Генконсульство России в Нарве
ANNEX 3: LIST OF 353 DOMAIN NAMES INVOLVED IN THE RRN CAMPAIGN (SOURCES: META, EU DISINFOLAB, VIGINUM)

- rrusianews[.]com
- memhouse[.]onlinne
- avisindependent[.]eu
- bild[.]live
- bild[.]ipc
- nti[.]world
- welt[.]tours
- dailymail[.]top
- republika[.]life
- defil[.]life
- dailymail[.]cam
- dailymail[.]cdf
- 20minutes[.]com
- ana[.]ltd
- rbk[.]kiev.ua
- spiegel[.]ltd
- lsm[.]li
- theguardian[.]co[.]com
- schlauspel[.]de
- tagesspiegel[.]ltd
- bild[.]asia
- bild[.]tv
- defil[.]today
- defil[.]top
- reuters[.]cdf
- rbk[.]today
- defil[.]cc
- spiegel[.]live
- spiegel[.]today
- t-online[.]life
- t-online[.]live
- t-online[.]today
- spiegel[.]today
- spiegel[.]fun
- spiegel[.]quest
- spiegel[.]fun
- t-online[.]cdf
- t-online[.]life
- t-online[.]today
- spiegel[.]pro
- suedeutsche[.]onlinne
- t-online[.]ife
- bild[.]eu.com
- bild[.]jve.com
- bild[.]jlc
- spiegel[.]co[.]com
- zetfitung[.]com
- spiegel[.]life
- spiegel[.]live
- spiegel[.]today
- welt[.]ltd
- faz[.]ltd
- t-online[.]life
- t-online[.]live
- t-online[.]today
- spiegel[.]agency
- spiegel[.]life
- suedeutsche[.]life
- suedeutsche[.]today
- suedeutsche[.]me
- nd-aktuell[.]net
- bild[.]expert
- obozrevatel[.]com
- bild[.]ws
- faz[.]agency
- nd-aktuell[.]pro
- spiegel[.]work
- suedeutsche[.]cc
- welt[.]jws
- nd-aktuell[.]co
- suedeutsche[.]co
- tagesspiegel[.]co
- welt[.]media
- bild[.]work
- faz[.]life
- spiegel[.]cab
- fraiesvokt[.]com
- fraiepoizition[.]live
- fraiepoizition[.]onlinne
- fraiepoizition[.]site
- fraiepoizition[.]store
- offenmaining[.]info
- offenmaining[.]live
- offenmaining[.]fun
- offenmaining[.]onlinne
- offenmaining[.]jw
- offenmaining[.]site
- offenmaining[.]website
- werbungsturk[.]fun
- werbungsturk[.]online
- werbungsturk[.]pw
- offenmaining[.]onlinne
- offenmaining[.]jw
- offenmaining[.]spac
- offenmaining[.]site
- offenmaining[.]website
- offenmaining[.]online
- offenmaining[.]spac
- offenmaining[.]site
- offenmaining[.]website
- aldrings[.]online
- aldrings[.]jw
- aldrings[.]space
- aldrings[.]website
- aldrings[.]online
- aldrings[.]jw
- aldrings[.]space
- aldrings[.]website
- dassprachcor[.]website
- dassprachcor[.]online
- dassprachcor[.]site
- dassprachcor[.]jspac
- dassprachcor[.]online
- dassprachcor[.]site
- dassprachcor[.]space
- lenneuzdekn[.]online
- lenneuzdekn[.]site
- lenneuzdekn[.]space
- lenneuzdekn[.]website
- lenneuzdekn[.]online
- lenneuzdekn[.]site
- lenneuzdekn[.]space
- lenneuzdekn[.]website
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- lenneuzdekn[.]website
- lenneuzdekn[.]online
- lenneuzdekn[.]site
- lenneuzdekn[.]space
- lenneuzdekn[.]website
ANNEX 4: DOMAIN NAMES USED FOR REDIRECTS

Single-use domain names

http://google-seo-top[.]com/
http://kabuana[.]com/
http://nursepedia[.]com/
http://eemnetwork[.]com/
http://flipform[.]net/
http://krectekno[.]net/
http://cyclenew[.]net/
http://orlybookstore[.]com/
http://dudetonics[.]com/
http://jeansmax[.]com/
http://scottoand-jennifer[.]com/
http://cosmowheel[.]com/
http://martinsapc[.]com/
http://texarkanagunswap[.]com/
http://mastermoshia[.]com/
http://waqexpay[.]com/
http://pipsisatis[.]com/
http://hhmap[.]com/
http://schoolofedutainment[.]com/
http://fastpointit[.]com/
http://elevateyourtaste[.]com/
http://silverhouseproperties[.]com/
http://siyabongamjalii[.]com/
http://asoprocafenpa[.]com/
http://codingsocially[.]com/
http://aquaculture-mail[.]org/
http://goshowl[.]org/
http://dropalo[.]com/
http://nukabd[.]com/
http://ncbdc[.]com/
http://wafwot[.]com/
http://intrnaitonalHaert[.]org/
http://ampian[.]com/
http://wisedtl[.]org/
http://corzap[.]com/
http://wunkit[.]com/
http://mangut[.]org/
http://peachserver[.]net/
http://keymorse[.]org/
http://pazzw[.]net/
http://huangmm[.]net/
http://thelucycode[.]com/
http://oonthegomatchmaking[.]com/
http://petliveapp[.]com/
http://conduisent[.]carlspalars[.]com/
http://elections[.]quick-educate[.]com/
http://promesse[.]techbass[.]com/
http://guerre[.]secureup[.]portal[.]com/
http://elections[.]thesharkesign[.]com/
http://1[.]parkingonthego[.]com/
http://2[.]soderemyn[.]com/
http://2[.]villadevondome[.]com/
http://1[.]soderemyn[.]com/
http://article6397[.]linkkommarket[.]com/
http://1[.]soderemyn[.]com/
http://investnewspro[.]com/
http://1[.]parkingonthego[.]com/
http://2[.]bestforbuyers[.]com/
http://2[.]baneanzealf[.]com/
http://pchaibrant[.]leprosypedia[.]com/
http://baneanzealf[.]com/
http://inc[.]taxbygain.com/
http://1[.]tiagoasd[.]com/
http://2[.]tiagoasd[.]com/
http://trib.sazoom[.]com/
http://2[.]dubaivisiatips[.]com/
http://1[.]dubaivisiatips[.]com/
https://michaelplaxico[.]com/
https://nexusfall[.]com/
https://swiftdawn[.]com

Permanent domain names

https://urlbox[.]onine
https://marvelgoodies[.]com
https://bighorn-advisors[.]com
https://gitver[.]com
https://rarelotion[.]com
https://gooddefr[.]com