



*« Jihadism has not weakened over the last twenty or more years, it has simply moved to new places and taken on new forms.*

*Responses to the threat it poses require mobilisation of all public policies: intelligence, security, justice and diplomacy.*

*It is the State as a whole, and, in addition, all the national community's living resources – its local authorities, political forces, enterprises and youth – which must mobilise around these challenges. »*

*(Strategic Review of Defence and National Security. 2017).*

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**FRANCE'S SECURITY  
STRATEGY:  
TACKLING TERRORISM  
TOGETHER**



Two years after the implementation of the *Plan d'Action contre la Radicalisation et le Terrorisme* (PART – Action Plan against Radicalisation and Terrorism), this new action plan against terrorism is designed to respond to a changing security challenge marked by repeated attacks perpetrated over the last eighteen months by essentially endogenous actors. The lethality and unpredictability of recent incidents calls for further adaptation of the State's levers of action.

Following three attacks that plunged the country into mourning in 2016, causing a total of 89 deaths, 2017 was also marked by three lethal attacks and the first months of 2018 by two terrorist attacks that caused a total of eight deaths overall.

Our country continues to be a priority target for jihadist groups and those that inspire them. The same goes for French fellow citizens and interest abroad, which are still subject to high levels of threat in countries within the crescent of crisis.

## **I. Since 2016, France has continued to face up to a high and constantly evolving terrorist threat**

### **I.1 A PREDOMINANTLY ENDOGENOUS THREAT**

The terrorist threat has evolved considerably since the significant setbacks suffered by ISIS in 2017 and the loss of almost all its holdings in the Syro-Iraqian region. Neutralisation of a good many of its leaders and its weakened operational capacities have contributed to a reduction in risks of planned action. However, the endogenous threat remains high across French soil.

In 2016, 9,300 individuals were reported to the authorities for violent radicalisation. There have been over 20,000 individuals reported up to now, including 5,500 via the *Centre National d'Assistance et de Prévention de la Radicalisation* (CNAPR – National Centre for Assistance and Prevention of Radicalisation) and over 9,000 by *departemental* security teams (*États-Majors de Sécurité*). 23% of such reports concern women and less than 5% concern minors.

This major increase in numbers of individuals monitored for radicalisation testifies to the hold that jihadist groups still have over minds and their ability to inspire endogenous actors, due in particular to dissemination of propaganda over the Internet.

Hence, since 2016, jihadist sympathisers present on French soil have been regularly encouraged to act on their impulses.

Attacks, abortive or otherwise, carried out over the last two years confirm the primacy of a diffuse and omnipresent endogenous threat. For the most part, their perpetrators have employed low-tech methods – knives and vehicle ramming in particular. Their targets may be chosen indiscriminately or more symbolically, such as representatives of the public authorities. Since May 2016, four successful attacks have targeted uniformed personnel, along with nine that failed and twelve that were foiled.

Other operational methods (improvised explosive devices, drones, booby-trapped vehicles and chemical products) could well make their appearance on our soil, not only in compliance with propaganda recommendations, but also with increasing technological skills on the part of radicalised individuals.

## 1.2 AN EVOLVING LONG-TERM THREAT

The nine attacks carried out on our territory since 2016, along with the 13 attempted attacks and 42 foiled terrorist actions over the same period, make it clear that the terrorist threat is lastingly rooted in our society. Fed by propaganda that may lack sophistication but is always active, the endogenous threat is ongoing. It may undergo major evolution under the emerging and combined influence of combatants returning from the Syro-Iraqian region and newly released prison inmates.

At 6 July 2018, 718 individuals of French nationality or resident in France were present in the Syro-Iraqian region, comprising 360 men, 312 women and 46 minors aged 13 and above. Hence, the threat posed by these combatants, who are still active in the Levant, remains vivid, due to their proven involvement in preparation of terrorist acts and influence on weak-willed individuals residing in France but unknown to the security services.

For the time being, the deteriorating situation in the Syro-Iraqian region has not yet led to any major return of French nationals. In 2016, 25 individuals returned from the region, as against 10 in 2017 and 9 at 1 June 2018. Three types of individuals are concerned: combatants still active in the area, captives, and women and children present in the Levant.

In addition, at 1 June 2018, French prisons held 512 individuals convicted of acts of terrorism and 1,145 inmates under common law who had been identified as radicalised. These figures have increased significantly since 2016. 48 Islamist terrorist inmates and 402 radicalised inmates under common are set to be freed by the end of 2019. The potential threat that they represent calls for special vigilance in their monitoring..

The threat posed by violent radical Islamism is increasingly diverse. Radicalisation of numerous individuals on French soil and risks connected with returning combatants and alleged terrorists currently imprisoned in Kurdistan, Iraq and Turkey, but who could well be set free in the near future, constitute a major security challenge that our country must confront with determination over the short, middle and long term.

It is on this basis that the Action Plan against Radicalisation and Terrorism's success should be assessed.

## 2. The Action Plan against Radicalisation and Terrorism (PART): a positive assessment, a dynamic worth renewing

The 80 measures contained in the Action Plan against Radicalisation and Terrorism, launched on 9 May 2016, were the spearhead of the public authorities' response in the fight against terrorism and radicalisation. The fight against radicalisation now has its own plan, the *Plan National de Prévention de la Radicalisation* (PNPR – National Plan to Prevent Radicalisation), which the Prime Minister presented in Lille on 23 February 2018.

Over the course of two years, the PART proved its use in interministerial action to combat radicalisation and terrorism and facilitated implementation and monitoring of a range of innovative actions.

With regard to combating terrorism, PART measures enabled:

- additional human and financial resources to be allocated to the intelligence services: the General Directorate for Internal Security's (DGSI) workforce increased from 3,301 in 2014 to a current total of 4,038, and that of the Territorial Intelligence Service from 1,967 to 2,600 over the same period;
- consolidation of coordination at all levels of the State, through creation of the *État-major opérationnel de prévention du terrorisme* (EMOPT – Operational Headquarters for the Prevention of Terrorism) at the Ministry of the Interior to oversee the increased importance and improvement in reliability of the *Fichier de signalement pour la prévention et la radicalisation à caractère terroriste* (FSPRT – Terrorism prevention and radicalisation reporting file), creation of the ALLAT interservice unit at the DGSI, and setup of assessment groups in each département to provide personalised monitoring of individuals registered on the FSPRT;

- deployment of a national intervention scheme to improve internal security forces' responsiveness in the event of an attack.

Continued upgrading of Government planning resulted in the Prime Minister approving new "Pirate" family intervention plans developed by the *Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité nationale* (SGDSN – General Secretariat for Defence and National Security) in liaison with the competent ministries and services:

- *Piragnet* Plan in June 2017;
- *Pirate Mer* Plan in July 2017;
- *Piratair-Intrusair* Plan in September 2017;
- new *Pirate Mobilités Terrestres* Plan in summer 2018

Organisation and coordination of maritime and port security was the subject of a new Interministerial Instruction issued in summer 2018 that replaced the provisional doctrine dating back to 2006.

In order to improve the Critical Infrastructure Protection, revision of *Directives Nationales de Sécurité* (DNSs – National Security Directives), under the aegis of coordinating ministries, resulted in adoption of two new DNSs<sup>1</sup>, reference documents enabling 293 operators of vital importance to draft special protection plans for 1,430 points of vital importance. Revision of the 22 DNSs will be completed in 2018.

In liaison with the Ministry of Interior, the SGDSN continued its training of Prefecture and decentralised department staff, reaching 236 Prefecture staff members from 70 *départements*, with a view to speeding up the process of approval of plans for protection of points of vital importance.

Continuation of the capabilities initiative, which seeks to consolidate resources and develop technologies enabling the State and operators to deal with major crises, including those brought about by terrorism, has been given concrete expression in particular by:

- acquisition of materials and equipment in the context of the Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical (NRBC) section of the *Contrat Général Interministériel* (CGI – General Interministerial Contract), to the tune of 4.7 million euros by the Ministry of the Interior and 6.9 million euros by the Ministry for Solidarity and Health, with support from the SGDSN to the tune of 1.7 million euros;
- development and testing out of innovative technological solutions adapted to current needs, under the aegis of the *Comité de la Filière des Industries de Sécurité* (CoFIS – Security Industry Sector Committee).

<sup>1</sup> - DNS on public research and DNS on food supply

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Implementation of the interministerial action plan for stepping up security on transport has been given concrete expression in particular by work on:

- background checks prior to access to restricted areas and exercise of sensitive functions;
- passenger safety when boarding and aboard ships operating under the French flag;
- implementation of Passenger Name Records (PNRs);
- development, testing out and deployment of capacities for detecting weapons and explosives in the public areas of railway stations, airports and multimodal transport hubs.

In addition, private security officers (PSOs) have had their prerogatives reinforced and extended. The so called “Savary” Law of 22 March 2016 authorises PSOs to carry out visual inspections and, with owners’ consent, searches of luggage, as well as security pat-downs, and extends the same provisions to SNCF<sup>2</sup> and RATP<sup>3</sup> internal security service officers. Pursuant to the Law of 20 June 2016 for the blue economy, ships operating under the French flag may now, upon request and on behalf of their owners, benefit from private protection to combat terrorist acts. This right is also extended to ships on French inland and territorial waters, pursuant to the Law of 28 February 2017 bearing on public safety.

Over 40 PART actions have been carried out successfully, and some twenty more were underway when the launch of the PACT was announced. This is why, while giving fresh impetus to the counterterrorism policy, the PACT also aims to take over at least some of the PART’s objectives and provide renewed visibility to the determined action taken by the Government since May 2017.

2 - French Railways

3 - Paris regional transportation

### **3. The Government has provided ongoing fresh momentum since May 2017**

France continues to be confronted by a high terrorism risk, with several attacks perpetrated since January 2018 and other attempted attacks that were either foiled or failed. A Government priority, the fight against terrorism remains a key issue in our national security strategy and is the subject of an unwavering interministerial government policy.

Since May 2017, the Government has implemented a wide range of initiatives and actions:

- Immediately after taking office, the President of the Republic took the decision to turn national intelligence coordination into national coordination of intelligence and counterterrorism, under the Presidency of the Republic, creating a *Centre National de Contre-terrorisme* (National Counterterrorism Centre). The decision made intelligence one of national security's key strategic focuses. The new organisation it brought about enabled decompartmentalisation of analysis of the threat by fostering pooling of information. In order to optimise services' response to the terrorist threat, the *Coordonnateur National du Renseignement et de la Lutte contre le Terrorisme* (CNRLT – National Coordinator of Intelligence and the Fight against Terrorism) works to step up coordination between services and within ministries. It also ensures optimal use of legally authorised intelligence techniques by all services concerned. In addition, in the context of its mission to provide strategic orientation, the CNRLT works with the departments and ministerial cabinets concerned to draft counterterrorism doctrine. Lastly, the CNRLT has further developed European and International cooperation on intelligence and counterterrorism, in particular by overseeing organisation of the “No Money for Terror” international conference against funding of terrorism, held in Paris on 25 and 26 April 2018, which brought together over 70 States and 15 international and regional organisations.
- Numerous initiatives have been taken to improve methods for monitoring individuals listed in the FSPRT:
  - As regards resources, an increase in the manpower of counterterrorism services has been confirmed, to the tune of 1,900 more staff over the coming five years;
  - As regards organisation, Prefects' role of providing impetus and ensuring coordination was reasserted by their chairing of regular meetings of *départemental* assessment groups and units for prevention of radicalisation and support to families, in order to enable effective monitoring of individuals. Such monitoring is designed to be carried out everywhere with the same attention, including in the apparently least impacted *départements* in terms of numbers, as the threat remains high throughout national territory, as is evidenced by the attack carried out in Trèbes;

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- As regards operation, intelligence service monitoring of the 10,500 individuals listed in the FSPRT has been stepped up, with targeted actions on:
  - preventing individuals listed in the FSPRT from possessing firearms;
  - monitoring individuals showing signs of psychological fragility;
  - locating and monitoring returning minors, thanks to work carried out in partnership with the Chancellery to locate each such minor and ensure they are monitored by the Prefects concerned;
  - systematising expulsion measures against foreigners who disturb public order and/or are listed in the FSPRT (ministerial circulars of 16 October 2017 and 14 April 2018) ;
  - monitoring of individuals newly released from prison, in close collaboration with the *Bureau Central du Renseignement Pénitentiaire* (BCRP – Central Office for Prison Intelligence), whether of individuals convicted of terrorist offences or individuals imprisoned for offences under common law and known to have been radicalised.
- Reinforcement of background checks has found concrete expression in the upscaling of the *Service National des Enquêtes Administratives de Sécurité* (SNEAS – National Service for Administrative Security Investigations) and the *Commandement Spécialisé pour la Sécurité Nucléaire* (CoSSeN – Specialised Command for Nuclear Security).
  - The SNEAS carries out administrative investigations of individuals prior to their access to transport company jobs connected with passenger safety, in order to check whether or not their behaviour is compatible with the performance of the duties involved. It has carried out 4,590 investigations since September 2017 at the request of 19 public transport companies.
  - Operational since May 2017, the CoSSeN became a *Service à Compétence Nationale* (SCN – Service with National Jurisdiction) in July the same year. Since 1 July 2017, it has carried out 178,673 administrative investigations prior to access to civil nuclear sites, in order to check whether or not the behaviour of the individuals concerned was compatible with such sites' security.
- The two SCNs make use of an automated personal data processing system entitled “*Automatisation de la Consultation Centralisée de Renseignements et de Données*” (ACCReD – Automation of Centralised Intelligence and Data Consultation). Created by the Decree of 3 August 2017, the system enables automated simultaneous consultation of seven police and/or gendarmerie files, after the Decrees bearing on creation of such files were amended on 2 August 2017, and of two intelligence files, via automatic referral to the competent departments.
- As regards legislation, enactment of the Law of 30 October 2017 stepping up *Sécurité Intérieure et la Lutte contre le Terrorisme* (SILT – Internal Security and the Fight against Terrorism) enabled an end to be put to the state of emergency and the strengthening of our judicial arsenal by inclusion in the Internal Security Code of provisions creating new administrative police measures available to the Minister of the Interior and Prefects, including *Mesures Individuelles de Contrôle Administratif et de Surveillance* (MICAS – Individual Administrative Control and Surveillance Measures), buffer zones, closing of places of worship, site visits (including places of residence) and checks in border areas. These are pragmatic tools, designed to prevent acts of terrorism and governed by specific guarantees. They are applicable up until 31 December 2020, guaranteeing their assessment by Parliament prior to their extension.

- In addition, in the face of the internal threat posed by radicalisation, the SILT Law's provisions, codified in Article L.114-1 of the Internal Security Code, now enable the compatibility of the behaviour of public servants in posts participating in maintenance of sovereignty or to do with security and/or defence (police officers, gendarmes, soldiers, prison officers, and customs officers) to be checked, including during performance of their duties, and action to be taken consequent to any incompatibility observed following an administrative investigation. Hence, when an administrative investigation shows that the behaviour of a given employee, whether tenured or under contract, has become incompatible with the exercise of his/her duties insofar as it poses a threat to public safety, the administration, following adversarial proceedings and if a transfer or change of posting is not possible, may proceed to his/her removal from the civil service roster (for civil servants) or dismissal (for employees under contract). The bodies whose opinions are required in the context of adversarial proceedings (Joint Commission for civil servants and Council for soldiers) were created by two Decrees of 27 February 2018.
- As regards private security officers, the performance of private security activities while carrying a weapon is covered by a Decree of 29 December 2017.
- Appointment, on 22 November 2017, of an ambassador for digital technology, who is responsible for international files in this field and has competence in cybersecurity, governance of the Internet and, in particular, the fight against the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.
- Published in February 2018, the *Revue Stratégique de Cyberdéfense* (Strategic Review of Cyberdefence) is the first major strategic summary of the state of play in this sphere. The Review provides an overview of the cyberthreat, makes proposals for improving the Nation's cyberdefence, and opens up prospects for improving French society's cybersecurity.
- For its part, the *Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Techniques de Renseignement* (CNCTR – National Commission for the Control of Intelligence Techniques), created by the Law of 24 July 2015, presented its activity report for 2017 in May 2018, shedding light on intelligence services' use of the new techniques authorised by the legislature. 21,386 individuals were the subject of at least one surveillance measure in 2017 (5% more than in 2016), 9,157 of them (42.8%) "with regard to prevention of terrorism".
- As regards the armed forces, their budget will be seeing an annual increase of 1.8 billion euros over the President's five-year term of office. Among other things, the increase will enable fulfilment of the French armed forces' commitments in the Sahel and Levant.
- Lastly, reorganisation of the *Sentinelle* operation was decided on by the President of the Republic in September 2017. Carried out in line with the armed forces protection commitment, it has led to an overall restructuring of the operation into three levels (base, manoeuvre and strategic reserve) and joint anticipatory work with the Ministry of the Interior. It provides the military operation with greater flexibility as a complement to action on the part of internal security forces to counter the terrorist threat. The presence of the armed forces for protection of the populace is now more flexible, more responsive, more unpredictable and therefore more dissuasive. More generally, the new Interministerial Instruction no.10100, signed by the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister for the Armed Forces on 14 November 2017, bore on new conditions governing the armed forces' engagement on French soil.

# 4. The goals of the 32 public actions of the Action Plan against Terrorism

In order to continue on from the *Plan d'Action contre la Radicalisation et le Terrorisme* (PART – Action Plan against Radicalisation and Terrorism), the Prime Minister decided to put the machinery for prevention of radicalisation and combating terrorism on a new footing, through two distinct approaches expressed in two thematic plans: the *Plan National de Prévention de la Radicalisation* (PNPR – National Plan to Prevent Radicalisation), and the *Plan d'Action Contre le Terrorisme* (PACT – Action Plan against Terrorism)

The *Revue Stratégique de Défense et de Sécurité Nationale* (Strategic Review of Defence and National Security) published in October 2017 reasserted “the unprecedented seriousness of the threat posed by militarised jihadist terrorism striking directly at Western societies”, “alongside an ongoing threat of more rudimentary and unforeseeable jihadist-inspired attacks”.

This is why, on 26 March 2018, the Prime Minister mandated the General Secretary for Defence and National Security to liaise with the National Coordinator of Intelligence and the Fight against Terrorism in drafting a new action plan against terrorism, drawing on all ministries and departments concerned.

In compliance with the mission letter, the General Secretary for Defence and National Security undertook the work required, incorporating three components:

- uncompleted measures implemented under the preceding PART, adapting them to the threat's evolution (anticipated end of the Caliphate, combatants returning from the Syro-Iraqian region, and the resurgence of Al Qaida);
- existing government measures, given interministerial coherence – i.e. by seeking a collective approach to their implementation;
- new measures aiming to improve and rationalise our counterterrorism mechanisms.

In order to ensure coherence and complementarity with the National Plan to Prevent Radicalisation, the interministerial action plan for stepping up security on transport and the Strategic Review of Cyberdefence, the Action Plan against Terrorism identified actions to be carried out in five priority fields::

- knowledge: better identifying and understanding the terrorist threat and the way it is evolving;
- hindrance: averting and preventing terrorist action thanks to better account being taken of individuals at risk, the fight against funding of terrorism, and efforts to settle conflicts that nurture the terrorist threat;

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- protection: adapting mechanisms for protecting people and property in view of identified threats, essentially via development of technological capabilities and greater involvement on the part of public and private operators;
- repression: optimising repression policies targeting perpetrators of terrorist crimes, as well as judicial processing of French jihadists;
- a Europe that protects: increasing synergies between European countries and promoting France's initiatives in the European Union in order to combat terrorism more effectively

**IN ADDITION TO THE 32 PUBLIC ACTIONS, A SERIES OF MEASURES TO BE IMPLEMENTED UNDER THE PLAN HAVE NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC DUE TO THEIR CONFIDENTIAL NATURE.**

**THE 32 PUBLIC  
ACTIONS TO  
CONSOLIDATE OUR  
COUNTERTERRORISM  
MECHANISMS**



# Knowledge: better identifying and understanding the terrorist threat and the way it evolves

Intelligence is a fundamental component of the fight against terrorism. The intelligence services' work will be all the more effective if they are better coordinated. This is the responsibility of the *Coordonnateur National du Renseignement et de la Lutte contre le Terrorisme* (CNRLT – National Coordinator of Intelligence and the Fight against Terrorism), both within the French intelligence community and internationally, bilaterally with partner countries, and within the European Union. For its part, the *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure* (DGSI – Directorate General for Internal Security) has had its role as operational leader consolidated.

### Action 1: Strengthening the DGSI's operational management of the fight against terrorism.

In coherence with the mission of strategic coordination entrusted to the *Coordonnateur National du Renseignement et de la Lutte contre le Terrorisme* (CNRLT – National Coordinator of Intelligence and the Fight against Terrorism) since June 2017, the DGSI will be responsible for operational coordination of intelligence, judicial inquiries under court authority, and the Ministry of the Interior's national and international cooperation strategies on counterterrorism.

The mission letter that the Minister of the Interior sent to the Director General of Internal Security laid out the Government's expectations with regard to the fight against terrorism and the DGSI's operational coordination prerogatives, assuming a continuum between international and endogenous threats.

### Action 2 : Constituer une cellule de profilage des auteurs d'attaques terroristes et d'identification des facteurs de passage à l'acte.

This interservice unit will carry out a study of characteristics common to perpetrators of attacks and attempted attacks with a view to producing objective criteria measuring the dangerousness of radicalised individuals and shedding light on the processes underlying one or more individuals' decision to turn to terrorism. This action will draw on analysis of work already published in France by researchers and private and public bodies, and on work carried out in other European countries.

## **Action 3: Making Prison Intelligence a *Service à Compétence Nationale* (Service with National Jurisdiction).**

Integrating the prison intelligence service into the national intelligence community gives concrete expression to the major challenge of monitoring prison inmates in the context of the fight against terrorism, in open and closed environments alike. In constant progress and recognised by its peers, prison intelligence has reached a stage in its development that calls for new measures, in particular with regard to organisation. Development of prison intelligence over the long term also requires creation of a specific professional pathway providing all the service's staff with satisfactory career and promotion conditions, along with an increase in budget: 108 positions will be created between 2018 and 2020 in the context of the Program Act.

## **Action 4: Preparing for developments in security technologies and adapting their legal framework.**

The ever-accelerating proliferation of innovations in digital technologies and their uses affects internal security methods as it does all forms of public action. In this context, it is essential that the State continues to adapt its position in order to detect new risks, frailties, terrorist threats and criminal uses connected with technological developments, and, conversely, make use of technological opportunities to improve its own means of action and protection of the population and anticipate appropriate regulatory adaptations. The Ministerial Coordinator on Artificial Intelligence has been tasked with analysing and making proposals on changes connected with the digital transformation in the field of internal security.

## **Action 5: Stepping up and systematising experience feedback (lessons learned) and the continuous improvement process.**

The CNRLT has been tasked with designing and implementing an experience feedback method covering all services concerned — operational services, intelligence services and investigating service alike – and which not only concerns successful attacks, but also includes foiled or failed actions. Such systematic feedback is overseen by the CNRLT.

# Hindrance: averting and preventing terrorist action

Drawing on better knowledge of the threat, prevention of terrorist action is also based on anticipation of releases from prison and international initiatives against the funding of terrorism and for settlement of conflicts.

### Action 6: Creating a permanent unit for monitoring released prisoners.

Almost 10% of imprisoned Islamist terrorists<sup>4</sup> and over a third of prison inmates under common law open to radicalisation<sup>5</sup>, whether on remand or convicted, will be free by the end of 2019, and over 80% of the 143 Islamist terrorists already convicted will be back on the street by 2022. These individuals present a variety of profiles posing multiple security challenges: proselytism, short-term threat represented by impulsive profiles, and medium- and long-term threats relating to planned attacks and attempts at redeployment in jihad areas abroad. A system enabling services to anticipate and take into account the release of such individuals is essential to prevent possible future terrorist actions. A permanent unit will be set up within the *Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Antiterroriste* (UCLAT – Unit for Coordination of Counterterrorism) with prison intelligence officers.

### Action 7: Reinforcing judicial control.

Compliance with obligations and prohibitions required of individuals charged with terrorist acts and placed under judicial control or house arrest under electronic surveillance is of major importance. Non-compliance with such types of control requires systematic judicial response. A workgroup composed of representatives of courts, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior has been tasked with identifying and proposing avenues for improvement of channels for dissemination and exchange of information, with modernisation of existing tracking files. Its recommendations will be the subject of an Interministerial Instruction in September. It will also be of use to identify conditions for more frequent recourse to house arrest under mobile electronic surveillance..

4 - Out of a total of 512 imprisoned Islamist terrorists at 28 May 2018.

5 - Out of a total of 1,145 such individuals at 28 May 2018.

### Action 8: Stepping up enforcement of antiterrorist sentences.

Paris currently has two *Juges d'Application des Peines Anti-Terroristes* (JAPATs – Judges responsible for execution of antiterrorist sentences). A special department will be set up directed by a First Vice-President and composed of three specialised judges.

This will enable positioning of the department in clearer coordination with the entire antiterrorist criminal justice system.

## COMBATING THE FUNDING OF TERRORISM

### At national level

### Action 9: Consolidating the antiterrorist asset-freezing system.

Our system for identification and monitoring of natural persons and legal entities connected with terrorism and likely to be the subject of national, European or international antiterrorist asset-freezing measures has been improved, as is evidenced by a significant increase in the number of individuals penalised: 189 assets freezes are currently in force.

### Action 10: Continuing the policy on suspension of social benefits.

In liaison with the Ministry for Solidarity and Health, the Ministry of the Interior (DGSI) provides social security bodies with information on individuals' confirmed departure from French territory to join terrorist groups in conflict zones. Social security bodies are able to suspend payment of benefits to such people. Social security bodies' own monitoring of individuals reported by the DGSI provides the latter with a further source of information on the possible return to France of people who have left jihad areas.

## At international level

### Action 11: Monitoring commitments made at the various relevant forums,,

in particular during the “No Money for Terror” international conference against funding of terrorism, held in Paris on 25 and 26 April 2018, which brought together over 70 States and 15 international and regional organisations. France is mobilising its partners to encourage implementation of the commitments made in Paris and keep the fight against the funding of terrorism as a central priority of international forums: the UN, Council of Europe, G7, G20 and FATF (Financial Action Task Force).

### Action 12: Making the fight against terrorism a priority of France’s presidency of the G7

France will take over the Presidency of the G7 in 2019. This will provide an unmissable opportunity to see that the G7 continues to implement ambitious counterterrorism measures and mobilise our partners on the priorities connected with the issue, including combating funding of terrorism in the wake of the “No Money for Terror” international conference against funding of terrorism, held in Paris on 25 and 26 April 2018.

## USING DIPLOMATIC ACTION TO HELP SETTLE CONFLICTS AND REINFORCE VULNERABLE STATES’ CAPACITIES

### Action 13: Contributing to the reform of the most vulnerable States’ security sectors and the training and equipping of their security forces.

Actions carried out should enable partner States to restore their authority in areas where they are currently unable to ensure their presence. Support lent by France aims to reinforce territorial coverage, States’ ability to intervene in complex situations, and develop advanced knowhow on intelligence and investigation, both on Internet and in the realm of financial flows. Our support is based on the principle according to which intelligence, investigation, interrogation and judicial monitoring missions must be in compliance with the regulations and customs of a State subject to the rule of law. Our action also aims to ensure that accusations are followed by fair criminal proceedings following judicial investigation.

# Protection: stepping up risk reduction policies

The national security strategy's main concern is protection of the population, the national territory and French interests, including abroad, against all risks and threats. Better knowledge of the terrorist threat and the ways it evolves enables the public authorities to adapt risk reduction policies in liaison with private operators, local authorities, and the population itself.

### Action 14: Developing a common culture of security within society.

The aim here is to increase levels of vigilance among all actors in society, public and private alike, and involve them more closely in acquisition of good reactions, in order to make direct contributions to the fight against terrorism and to national resilience. This requires combining and coordinating work carried out by the public authorities and private operators, in particular through national dialogue on security with the country's vital forces and responsables of security and safety in the private sector. Dissemination of best practices guides to school principals and shopping centre and museum managers is one illustration of this action. A new dissemination campaign is planned for the start of the upcoming school year.

### Action 15: Optimising the armed forces' and operational reserves' contribution to protection of the national territory in the face of the terrorist threat

In the context of the "Sentinelle" operation, employment of the armed forces in field missions will be optimised in view of the evolution of the threat and their complementarity with internal security forces. Such adaptation, permanent in nature, will also accompany reinforcement of employability of operational reserves and the capacity to mobilise them

### Action 16: Improving protection of sensitive sites and speeding up development of security technologies.

What is common to all sensitive sites, whether critical infrastructure, Seveso classified industrial concerns or public spaces, is that they constitute priority targets for terrorists. This is why their vulnerability must be decreased by implementing risk reduction policies. This requires combining and coordinating work on the part of the public authorities and private operators, and making use of security technologies adapted to current needs, in order to increase human resource capacities. The *Comité de la Filière des Industries de Sécurité* (CoFIS – Security Industry Sector Committee) will be proposing innovative options in this area.

### Action 17: Facilitating compensation of terrorism victims.

The draft programming law for justice provides for creation of a *Juge de l'Indemnisation des Victimes d'Actes de Terrorisme* (JIVAT – judge specifically dedicated to compensation of terrorism victims).

The judge will be attached to the *Tribunal de grande instance de Paris* (Paris Judicial Court) and will have national competence. This will enable unification of jurisprudence on recognition of the status of terrorism victim and the various rights that go with it, as well as rationalisation of their compensation pathways. Judges assigned to legal proceedings on acts of terrorism will then be able to concentrate exclusively on criminal investigations.

A range of measures complementing creation of the JIVAT will enable reinforcement of the guarantees provided for in the context of the amicable expert assessment before the *Fonds de Garantie des Victimes des actes de Terrorisme et d'autres Infractions* (FGTI – Guarantee Fund for Victims of Terrorism and Other Offences): constitution of a national list of experts specialising in assessment of physical injury, standardised assessment procedures, and further assurance of a fair hearing in proceedings conducted by the FGTI.

### Action 18: Consolidating administrative background checks.

In a context of high terrorist threat largely connected with the phenomenon of violent radicalisation, administrative security investigations, carried out on the basis of Articles L. 114-1 and L. 114-2 of the Internal Security Code, help secure access to sensitive locations and job functions. Three avenues for their improvement must be pursued: widening the scope of administrative investigations to sensitive functions exercised in the context of activities of vital importance, deducing the consequences that an opinion of incompatibility might have on employment relationships, and optimising investigation procedures in order to make them more efficient. In addition, administrative investigations carried out by the Ministry for the Armed Forces pursuant to Article L. 114-1 will be handled by the *Service National des Enquêtes Administratives de Sécurité* (SNEAS – National Service for Administrative Security Investigations), whose expansion it will accompany. In this context, the Ministry for the Armed Forces will benefit from access to the ACCReD platform. Work will be carried out in parallel with implementation of Measure 19 of the PNPR, which aims to define an interministerial doctrine on administrative investigations of radicalised public servants carrying out missions of sovereignty or to do with security or defence.

### Action 19: Anticipating responses to emerging threats – nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical, explosives and drones.

It is necessary to anticipate eventual malicious use of biological agents and toxic substances. In order to be more effective, measures restricting the general public's access to explosives precursors and combating misappropriation and theft of explosives will be strengthened. In view of the development of civil drones, the risk of malicious use of drones available on the market must also be reduced by progressive deployment of active neutralisation systems.

### Action 20: Stepping up protection of French communities and holdings abroad.

France is represented abroad by the world's third largest diplomatic and consular network (around 500 sites), the largest cultural network (almost 500 French Institutes, some forty research institutes and over 400 *Alliances Françaises*) and the largest school network (500 schools of varying statuses), plus sites belonging to other ministries and administrative entities (French Agency for Development, *Institut de recherche pour le développement* (IRD – Research Institute for Development), Business France, etc.). As part of its mission to protect French nationals throughout the world, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs' investment and local organisation priorities include the increased level of the terrorist threat directly targeting French interests and, more generally, places visited by tourists and westerners.

### Action 21: Supporting stabilisation of crisis areas and countries most affected by radicalisation.

Continuing on from its emergency action, France will be stepping up its action in countries in crisis and/or postcrisis situations in order to lend support to transition processes and pave the way to reconstruction and development. Such support to crisis recovery should above all be provided to countries affected by radicalisation, in particular in the Middle East, North Africa and the Lake Chad Basin, in order to actively combat terrorism.

## Punishing perpetrators of terrorist crimes

### Action 22: Creating a Parquet National Anti-Terroriste (PNAT)

Creation of a *Parquet National Anti-Terroriste* (PNAT- National Antiterrorism Prosecution Service), provided for in the draft Organic Law accompanying the draft Programming Law for Justice, will enable consolidation of public action in the fight against terrorism. Counterterrorist action has accounted for much of the Paris Public Prosecutor's activity and it would seem essential to enable a Public Prosecutor to devote all his/her time to combating terrorism. The mission requires continuous exchanges in order to properly coordinate administrative and judicial responses, along with a strong embodied presence.

In this highly specialised field, it would also appear necessary for a dedicated Public Prosecutor's office to prosecute any case arising from its investigations before the Assize Court, whereas at present it is the Paris Court of Appeal's Public Prosecutor's office that acts as prosecutor at the Assize Court. The proposed solution would redress the problem as the PNAT would also prosecute terrorist criminal cases before the special Assize Court, giving overall coherence to public action.

The PNAT will have competence with regard to the terrorist offences listed in Article 706-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as for similar offences, crimes against humanity and war crimes concerning the same areas (Syria and Iraq in particular), the same interlocutors (*Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure* (DGSi – Directorate General for Internal Security), *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure* [DGSE – General Directorate for External Security], *Direction du Renseignement Militaire* [DRM – Directorate for Military Intelligence], *Direction du Renseignement et de la Sécurité de la Défense* [DRSD – Directorate for Defence Intelligence and Security] and the armed forces central command) and requiring special investigation techniques necessitating proficiency in the machinery of international cooperation.

The scheme will ensure full coverage with territorial public prosecutors' offices.

### Action 23: Providing judges with further training on counterterrorism.

As from November 2018, the *École Nationale de la Magistrature* (ENM – National School for the Judiciary) will be delivering a new training programme, the “*Parcours approfondi de contre-terrorisme*”(Advanced counterterrorism course”), which will include a series of training modules spread across a year. This in-depth programme is designed to promote a real counterterrorism culture and provide actors in the fight against terrorism with the most effective tools. The course is intended for antiterrorist judges on the bench and public prosecutors, and will also be open to members of institutions involved in antiterrorism activities, including prison administration and Ministry of the Interior staff and members of the armed forces. It will also include an international component, with exchanges between European antiterrorist judges.

## A Europe that protects

The European Union is an area of freedom and prosperity. It is also an area of solidarity and security which must be further strengthened in the face of the terrorist threat.

It is more than ever necessary to optimise synergies between European countries and the Union’s institutions and agencies. France is playing a leading role in this respect.

### Action 24: Promoting creation of a European Intelligence Academy.

This Academy, announced by the President of the Republic at the Sorbonne in September 2017, will be set up in a European intergovernmental context. It will deliver theme-based sessions bringing intelligence practitioners together around subjects of common interest to provide feedback on or share experiences, along with dedicated training programmes in the form of awareness-raising sessions for audiences outside the intelligence community (French and European senior civil servants, company directors, etc.). An initial awareness-raising session is planned for the first quarter of 2019.

### Action 25: Stepping up control capacities on European Union borders.

Measures to step up control capacities on European Union borders are based on new databases and information systems such as the PNR (Passenger Name Record), ETIAS (European Travel Information and Authorisation System) and EES (Entry-Exit System), which France would like to see extended to beneficiaries of freedom of movement (European nationals and holders of long-term residence permits). They are also coordinated with such enhanced systems as SIS II (Schengen Information System), VIS (Visa information system) and EURODAC (Database for matching asylum seekers' fingerprints), as well as with the upcoming more secure identity documents. Their interoperability creates synergies between these various systems in accordance with the "hit/no hit" principle, under the aegis of the EU-LISA (European Agency for the Operational Management of Large IT Systems). In the end, these systems will step up control and registration capacities at external borders, so better ensuring European citizens' safety within the free movement area.

### Action 26: Combating the funding of terrorism.

In February 2016, following the attacks of 13 November 2015, the Commission unveiled an action plan dedicated to combating the funding of terrorism; which has been partially implemented. The project comprises revision of the 4th anti-money laundering directive, measures on confiscation of criminal assets, and two proposals: the first for a regulation bearing on recognition of freezes and confiscations of such assets, and a second for a directive on exchange of information between financial intelligence units and enforcement authorities. In addition, a proposal for a so-called "Cash Control" regulation bearing on monitoring of hard cash entering or exiting the Union, a proposal for a regulation on importation of cultural goods, and study of possible setup of a European Terrorist Finance Tracking System (TFTS) are currently being considered to complement the existing agreement with the United States on its Terrorist Finance Tracking Program. France has been leading the way in this area since the "No Money for Terror" international conference held in Paris in April 2018.

### **Action 27: Combating the traffic in firearms and explosives.**

Terrorists' use of light and small-calibre arms during the Paris attacks highlighted the need for regulating the legal firearms market. A new directive on acquisition and possession of firearms came into force in May 2018. It aims to tighten up rules governing acquisition and possession of certain categories of especially lethal weapons, semi-automatics in particular, as well as providing for stricter supervision of exemption for certain categories of individuals (sports shooters, collectors, etc.). Work on its transposition into French law should be completed by 14 September 2018 at the latest. Publication of the Decree of 29 June 2018 was a step in its transposition. Three other Orders are also set to be adopted. In addition, revision of Implementing Regulation 2015/2403 bearing on common standards for deactivation of firearms should result in its adoption in October 2018.

### **Action 28: Increasing removal of illegal Internet content advocating terrorism.**

Combating illegal content on Internet is one of today's greatest challenges. Major actions have been implemented at European level. Partnerships have been concluded with top Internet actors to improve identification, removal and dereferencing of such content. This cooperative approach has produced results but also has its limitations. Work carried out by the Internet Forum shows that progress varies from one platform to another, that few of them include warnings against content advocating terrorism in their general conditions, and that they do not take account of small archiving platforms on which influxes of terrorist content are observed. France, along with other European partners including Germany and the United Kingdom, is committed to enactment of legislation imposing obligations on Internet actors with regard to removal of illegal content, with content advocating terrorism first in line. The European Commission has issued a recommendation in this respect.

### **Action 29: Improving the European civil protection mechanism.**

Creation of a European civil protection force is an aim supported by France. Initially, reform of the European civil protection mechanism provides for a new European intervention capacity, the RescEU, which would intervene as a last resort. The question of more extensive pooling of resources is also raised in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-2027. In this regard, France is stressing the coherence of bringing all resources dedicated to civil protection together within a single "Guaranteeing Europeans' security" mission. In compliance with its wishes, civil protection will be assigned a crisis-management tool in the context of the post-2020 MFF.

## Action 30: Improving protection of terrorism victims within the European Union.

Solidarity with, support to and compensation of victims of terrorism and their families is an integral part of the response to terrorism at national and European level. The European Union has already developed a legal framework for support and protection of victims across Europe. The Directive on victims' rights provides for a series of enforceable rights for all victims of criminal acts, including the rights to protection, support and assistance, which take account of each victim's individual needs. The Directive of 15 March 2017 on the fight against terrorism provides for measures that meet terrorism victims' needs more specifically. Drawing on the EU's existing legal framework, it promotes effective cooperation between the authorities and entities responsible for protecting victims of terrorism, in order to facilitate rapid exchange of information, assistance in the event of a terrorist attack, and a harmonised compensation system.

## Action 31: Making European industry an actor in the Union's security

The evolution of threats and risks, along with that of ever more intensive international competition, necessitates a fresh initiative to structure European industry – firstly, around a selection of large-scale flagship projects for protection of European citizens, and secondly, by maintaining European autonomy with regard to critical security and cybersecurity technologies. The final aim will be to launch several capacity-acquisition programmes on four priorities with the dual challenge of stepping up the Union's security and providing European industrial concerns with the opportunity to develop a domestic market at EU level: :

- the securing of the Schengen Areas' borders;
- the digital transformation and interoperability of security forces;
- protection of critical transport and energy infrastructures;
- the securing of the smart city.

## Action 32: Promoting a European Central Register, hosted by Eurojust, with regard to terrorism.

France proposes creation of a European antiterrorist register (or "European order office"). Its proposal, which excludes assignment of operational powers to Eurojust, seeks to centralise judicial information on terrorism, including identities of convicted individuals and those of suspects in investigations underway. Eurojust would be provided with a new, more proactive mission at the service of member States' judicial authorities, in carrying out analyses at Union level and informing them of any links that might exist between their investigations and those taking place in other member States. The register would constitute a first step in improving Europe's judicial response to terrorism and would enable assessment of the role that a dedicated European Public Prosecutor's office might eventually come to play.



# APPENDIX

## THE PRIME MINISTER'S MANDATE TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

*Le Premier Ministre*

Paris, le

26 MARS 2018

### NOTE

A l'attention de

**Madame la Secrétaire Générale de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale**

**Objet** : Elaboration d'un plan d'action contre le terrorisme.

La revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale a rappelé « *la gravité inédite de la menace représentée par un terrorisme jihadiste militarisé, frappant directement les sociétés occidentales* », « *doublée d'une menace persistante d'attentats inspirés, plus rudimentaires et imprévisibles* ».

Priorité du gouvernement, la lutte contre le terrorisme demeure un enjeu majeur de notre stratégie de sécurité nationale et doit faire l'objet d'une politique gouvernementale forte et inscrite dans une logique interministérielle.

Sous l'impulsion du Président de la République, le Gouvernement a déjà procédé à d'importantes réformes dans ce domaine : création de la *coordination nationale du renseignement et de la lutte contre le terrorisme* (CNRLT), renforcement de notre arsenal législatif qui a permis de sortir de l'état d'urgence, rénovation des conditions d'engagement des armées sur le territoire national dans le cadre de l'opération *Sentinelle*.

Dans la continuité de ces réformes, il est apparu nécessaire de refonder le dispositif de prévention de la radicalisation et de lutte contre le terrorisme à travers deux approches distinctes destinées à prendre le relais du *plan d'action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme* (PART) adopté en mai 2016.

A cet effet, le *comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation* (CIPDR) a validé un plan national de prévention de la radicalisation qui a été rendu public le 23 février à Lille.

Sur le volet de la lutte contre le terrorisme, nous vous demandons de conduire, en lien avec la CNRLT et en associant l'ensemble des ministères et services concernés, les travaux de rédaction d'un nouveau plan d'action, en intégrant trois composantes :

- les mesures non finalisées du précédent PART en les adaptant à l'évolution de la menace (attrition territoriale de Daesh au proche et moyen Orient, relocalisation des terroristes de la zone syro-irakienne, réévaluation du risque lié à Al Qaida et ses affidés) ;

- des mesures gouvernementales qui sont à porter en cohérence interministérielle dans un plan d'action à forte lisibilité : stratégie diplomatique de coopération anti-terroriste tant au plan européen qu'international, renforcement des mesures de contrôle judiciaire, gel des avoirs, affectation de renforts au sein des services en charge de la lutte contre le terrorisme, lutte contre le financement du terrorisme sur le territoire national, etc. ;
- de nouvelles mesures visant à améliorer et à rationaliser notre dispositif de lutte contre le terrorisme : mise en cohérence des périmètres missionnels incluant la compétence territoriale des services de renseignement et de sécurité intérieure, y compris les services d'intervention, mutualisation des moyens et des techniques de renseignement, rationalisation des structures centrales et territoriales des services, évolution des méthodes d'investigation, amélioration de la coordination et décloisonnement entre les services chargés de la prévention et de la lutte contre le terrorisme sur le territoire national comme à l'étranger, échanges de cadres entre les services, formation et filières universitaires spécifiques.

A cette fin, vous identifierez les actions à mener dans quatre domaines prioritaires :

- connaître : mieux identifier et comprendre la menace terroriste et ses évolutions, à l'étranger comme sur le territoire national ;
- entraver : prévenir et empêcher les passages à l'acte grâce à une meilleure prise en compte des menaces individuelles et collectives, des modes opératoires et des moyens de soutien et de propagande.
- protéger : renforcer les dispositifs de protection des personnes et des biens, au regard des menaces identifiées, notamment par une consolidation de nos planifications et par une implication accrue des opérateurs publics et privés ;
- réprimer : poursuivre l'adaptation de l'autorité judiciaire et de l'administration pénitentiaire dans leurs structures et leurs méthodes en optimisant notamment les politiques de répression des auteurs d'infractions terroristes et en anticipant la question des fins de peines des condamnés terroristes.

Après concertation interministérielle sous l'égide de mon cabinet, vous nous proposerez ce plan d'action dans un délai permettant une communication publique au début du mois de juin 2018. Une fois approuvé, vous assurerez, en lien étroit avec la CNRLT, le pilotage de la mise en œuvre de ce plan d'action contre le terrorisme et vous nous rendrez compte régulièrement de son avancement.

Edouard PHILIPPE

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# ACTION PLAN AGAINST TERRORISM



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13 July 2018

[www.gouvernement.fr](http://www.gouvernement.fr)  
[www.sgdsn.gouv.fr](http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr)