



**PREMIER  
MINISTRE**

*Liberté  
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**General Secretariat for Defence and  
National Security**

**Interministerial reference document on the national  
resilience strategy in the field of defence and  
national security**

***“Collective, solid, long-term resilience in the face of a  
crisis”***

# INTRODUCTION

Successive crises (COVID-19, war in Ukraine, devastating natural disasters) in an interdependent world that is seeing an increase in conflict, including high-intensity conflict, and the effects of climate change, are leading us to re-examine our capacity to deal with major cross-cutting crises, whatever their origins, and when they can also combine. Our capacity to prepare the State, local authorities, economic operators and the populace must be embodied in a *National Resilience Strategy* (NRS). It aims to bring together, combine and unify all public policies contributing to the resilience of the Nation.

Against a backdrop of the return of high-intensity conflicts and the persisting terrorist threat, the emergence of new risks (hybrid, cyber, systemic risks) as well as the prospect of major upcoming events – Rugby World Cup 2023, Paris Olympic Games 2024 – it seems desirable to learn the lessons of thirty years of crises by building an interministerial strategy to deal with them.

This strategy is necessarily gradual, as the notion of resilience is changeable and involves many stakeholders. Therefore, it was envisaged to focus first on all the ministerial departments before extending it to regional and local authorities, economic operators and then to the population.

The approach is operational, covering actions already carried out by each ministry. They are associated with metrics that will enable them to be monitored. The State maintains that public policies contributing to resilience therefore remain the responsibility of each ministerial department, in accordance with the Defence Code.

The objective of the NRS is therefore to prepare in-depth for future crises and, to this end, to have a cross-cutting, aggregated picture of the public policies contributing to the Nation's resilience, in all sectors. De-compartmentalising the approach of the various stakeholders is the result, for an honest re-appraisal of our systems and to identify areas to be worked on.

The work carried out also aims to strengthen the coherence of France's action at international and European levels. As NATO and the EU made the notion of resilience core to their strategic objectives, the NRS must ensure that our national measures are fully linked to the measures adopted in these respects and promote joint actions. During the French Presidency of the EU, France carried out a comparative study of the resilience systems of the twenty-seven EU Member States.

If the NRS sums up all the efforts developed to enable us to strengthen our capacity to handle a major crisis, two key elements contribute to its success; firstly the involvement of the population correlated with specific training and full information and, secondly the ability to continue our efforts over the long term.

**Stéphane Bouillon**

The Secretary-General for Defence and National Security

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## PART 1: RESILIENCE AS A CORNERSTONE OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

### **A. While the notion of resilience has recently been included in international and national policy objectives...**

#### **1. In France, resilience has been defined since 2008**

According to the French Defence Code<sup>1</sup>, the purpose of the national security strategy is to identify all the threats and risks likely to affect the life of the Nation, particularly with regard to the protection of the population, territorial integrity, and the permanence of the institutions of the Republic, and to determine the responses that the public authorities must provide. The Prime Minister directs Government action in matters of national security in France. The PM is responsible for national defence and the ultimate head of the military. In this capacity, the PM decides on the preparation and high command of operations and coordinates the defence activities of all ministerial departments. Lastly, the Prime Minister prepares and coordinates the action of the public authorities in the event of a major crisis.

Ministers are each responsible, under the authority of the Prime Minister, for the preparation and execution of the national defence and security measures falling within their department.

In the field of defence and national security, the notion of resilience is defined in the 2008 White Paper as *“the willingness and ability of a country, society and government to withstand the consequences of a major attack or disaster, and then rapidly restore their ability to function normally, or at least in a socially acceptable manner. It concerns not only public authorities, but also economic actors and civil society as a whole.”*

In 2013, the notion was integrated into the national defence and security strategy, which *“must allow for better orchestration and greater coherence in the mobilisation of all concerned to build the Nation’s resilience”*.

It is reaffirmed in the January 2021 update of the Strategic Review which states: *“implementation of a strategic ‘protection-resilience’ function is now essential. Indeed, the notions of protection and resilience complement each other, resilience being an indispensable pre-requisite to ensure the protection of the French people and territory and to guarantee continuity of the essential functions of the Nation. The logic of this function could also be extended to our European partners and allies.”*

Therefore, the foundations of our defence policy guarantee, or at least their sole and main objective is to guarantee, the independence, sovereignty and protection of our territory and population, in metropolitan France, the DROM-COM and abroad.

Resilience is part of a continuum between national security and defence including the preservation of our strategic interests.

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<sup>1</sup> Articles L1111-1, L1131-1 and L1141-1.

## **2. At the international and European level, resilience is integrated into the main defence and security strategies**

### **a) NATO has incorporated the notion of resilience since the 2016 Warsaw Summit and it was strengthened in 2021**

The Warsaw Summit further enshrined the notion of resilience in the Alliance's strategy, notably in paragraph 73 of the final communiqué<sup>2</sup>. This commitment was reinforced by a further communiqué at the Brussels summit in 2021.

The *Civil Emergency Planning Committee* (CEPC) - which became the *Resilience Committee* in 2022<sup>3</sup> - is NATO's main advisory body on the protection of civilian populations and the use of civil resources in support of the organisation's objectives. It is based on Article 3 of the Treaty. It meets weekly in permanent session (at which countries are represented by their national NATO representation) and twice a year (in May and November) in plenary session involving the heads of national civil emergency planning organisations. Since the Brussels Summit, a new senior resilience format has been established, chaired by the NATO Secretary General (SG). While some nations are considering the possibility of being represented by a minister, the format takes into account the diversity of governmental organisations in each State.

Under the influence of several member States (including the United Kingdom), the CPEC, i.e. the civilian component of NATO, now has a unique place. Although non-binding, the recommendations issued by this committee now go beyond the initial scope of support for Alliance military operations by covering new subjects that lead member states to take a stance on strategies that they are not always fully following domestically (hybrid threats, the fight against information manipulation, resilience of certain strategic sectors). NATO consequently intends to get involved in areas of competence that were either until now the domain of member States as part of their own sovereignty, or in the process of being developed in other bodies (the EU in particular).

The CEPC has established 7 basic resilience requirements that each Ally must be able to ensure: continuity of government and critical services; resilience of energy supply; uncontrolled movement of populations; resilience of food and water resources; management of large numbers of casualties; resilience of telecommunications systems; transport resilience. They form the subject of an annual report which provides a summary assessment of the Alliance's resilience and avenues of work which should lead France to avail itself of a coherent strategy in this area.

On 4 December 2020, at the European Defence Agency's annual conference, the NATO Deputy Secretary General reiterated the holistic approach to resilience between the EU and NATO<sup>4</sup>. This speech is part of the Alliance's strategic thinking (NATO 2030) published on 25 November 2020<sup>5</sup>.

At the Brussels Summit on 14 June 2021, heads of State and of governments renewed and strengthened the commitment to resilience made in 2016. They affirmed that national and collective resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence, and the effective performance of the Alliance's core tasks. Resilience also

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<sup>2</sup> "Today we have made a commitment to continue to enhance our resilience and to maintain and further develop our individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. Civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies' resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective defence. While this remains a national responsibility, NATO can support Allies in assessing and, upon request, enhancing their civil preparedness. We will improve civil preparedness by achieving the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience, which focus on continuity of government, continuity of essential services, security of critical civilian infrastructure, and support to military forces with civilian means. In this context, we welcome the Resilience Guidelines approved by Defence Ministers in June 2016." Enhanced commitment to resilience, endorsed at the Brussels 2021 Summit.

<sup>3</sup> See "NATO 2030 - Establishing resilience objectives and nationally-developed goals" (January 2022).

<sup>4</sup> "Resilience has become one of the subjects that both our organisations are working on. As you know, NATO has developed important baseline requirements for resilience over the last five years and we welcome the fact that the European Commission and the European Union are also addressing this issue. I think that together we can have a comprehensive approach to resilience which is becoming, you know, one of the lessons learned from this pandemic."

<sup>5</sup> NATO 2030 - United for a New Era, analysis and recommendations of the reflection Group appointed by the NATO Secretary General (November 2020): "NATO and the EU should increase parallel and coordinated efforts toward planning for resilience. *The two organisations should seek to improve how they jointly deliver on all of the basic requirements of resilience: minimising damage, restoring stability quickly, and catalysing improved strategies for similar challenges in the future.*"

means efforts to safeguard populations can be stepped up. The upcoming Madrid Summit will further develop these concepts, including the establishment of national, albeit non-binding, resilience targets.

**b) The EU is committed to building resilience into all its public policies**

The European Commission's Strategic Foresight Report 2020<sup>6</sup>, published in September 2020, made resilience its central theme, stating that the concept has become its "new compass for EU policy-making in the context of the COVID-19 crisis". For the EU, resilience is the ability not only to withstand and cope with challenges but also to undergo transitions in a sustainable, fair and democratic manner. The Commission's work programme for 2021 "A Union of vitality in a world of fragility" also places a strong emphasis on resilience.

In its 2021 report<sup>7</sup> entitled "The European Union's capacity and freedom to act", it lists the main challenges to be addressed:

- Ensuring sustainable and resilient health and food systems;
- Securing decarbonised and affordable energy;
- Strengthening capacity in data management, artificial intelligence and cutting edge technologies;
- Securing and diversifying supply of critical raw materials;
- Ensuring first-mover global position in standard-setting;
- Building resilient and future-proof economic and financial systems;
- Developing and retaining skills and talents matching EU ambitions;
- Strengthening security and defence capacities and access to space;
- Working with global partners to promote peace, security and prosperity for all;
- Strengthening the resilience of institutions.

In the specific area of defence and national security, the EU's strategic compass is a think-tank exercise for the 27 Member States on the model of a "White Paper" to be adopted under the French Presidency. Based on the first common European threat analysis, this document will help to define a common political vision and to plan and reinforce better-targeted defence capabilities.

More generally, the European Council of 21-22 October 2021 reiterated that, on the basis of the experiences of the COVID-19 crisis, the EU's resilience to, and horizontal preparedness for, crises must be strengthened and that it is important to reinforce the EU's preparedness and crisis response by adopting an "all-risks" approach.

With this in mind, on 23 November 2021 the EU Council adopted conclusions on strengthening preparedness, response and resilience to future crises.

The French Presidency of the EU wished to reactivate an ad hoc working group which by June 2022 will examine the need or opportunity to improve or strengthen the IPCR, the Council's mechanism for an integrated political crisis response, enabling the Presidency to coordinate the response at a political level to major, complex crises with multiple impacts. On the migration side, this mechanism has been in "full activation" mode since November 2015. It was also activated during the COVID crisis and most recently on 28 February when Russia attacked Ukraine, in particular to ensure a coordinated response at European level with regard to handling displaced persons from Ukraine. In the field of national defence and security, a range of legislative and technical work is being carried out.

The purpose of the **proposed Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities (RCE)** is to require Member States to adopt certain measures to ensure the provision of essential services in the internal market. It aims to strengthen the resilience of operators (referred to as critical entities) to a range of natural and man-made hazards, both intentional and accidental, and to safeguard national security. More specifically, the proposal aims to meet four objectives:

<sup>6</sup> Strategic Foresight Report 2020 "Strategic Foresight - Charting the course towards a more resilient Europe", [COM\(2020\) 493](#) final of 9 September 2020.

<sup>7</sup> Strategic Foresight Report 2021 "The European Union's capacity and freedom to act", [COM\(2021\) 750](#) of 8 September 2021.

- Ensure a better level of knowledge of the risks faced by critical entities;
- Ensure that Member States identify and designate all critical entities according to the Directive's criteria;
- Ensure that the full range of resilience activities is included in public policy and operational practice;
- Build capacity and improve cooperation and information sharing between stakeholders - mainly EU institutions, Member States, and the critical entities.

## **HERA**

On 16 September 2021, the European Commission presented a Communication and an Internal Decision describing the tasks, governance and financing of the future European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority, as well as a proposal for a Regulation on management of medical countermeasures in the event of health emergencies, which is the "emergency" component of the Authority. The internal structure was officially implemented on 1 October and the emergency component has been operational since 1 January 2022. The structure operates in two modes: preparedness mode and emergency mode.

In the first, HERA is responsible for anticipating emergencies and preparing responses through risk assessment and threat monitoring, promoting R&D&I, strengthening and securing supply chains and exchanging

knowledge and good practice. It also has an international dimension, notably to support low and middle income countries in building their response plans, developing their local production capacities and developing inclusive knowledge sharing programmes.

The specific regulation on the procurement of medical countermeasures, formally adopted on 20 December 2021, details these roles during an emergency, and their implementation. This includes verifying the proper deployment of response plans as anticipated, procuring, purchasing and manufacturing medical countermeasures and raw materials, establishing a medical countermeasures management mechanism, activating emergency research and innovation plans, activating EU FAB mechanisms to boost production capacity and releasing emergency funds.

The Authority has a budget of €6 billion over 6 years from NextGenerationEU (NGEU) and existing programmes such as EU4Health, RescEU and Horizon Europe. Member States will also contribute to funding, including through IPCEI. Additional resources in the event of a crisis would come through emergency support instruments (ESI).

## **Information manipulation**

The European External Action Service is working on the creation of a toolbox against foreign interference and manipulation of information. This toolbox would be part of the more comprehensive scheme developed in the EU Council to combat hybrid threats. The toolbox would build on existing tools (StratCom task forces, Early Warning Network on Information Manipulation).

In addition, the EU Council Working Group on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats (ERCHT) is developing a mechanism to respond to hybrid threats, including information manipulation. The ERCHT group will propose Council conclusions to define the broad outlines and how it is activated, and how it works alongside other instruments, including those of the EEAS and the Commission.

At the end of May 2021, the Commission published its guidelines for strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation, which call for an increase in the number of signatories, and a broadening of the scope of targeted services (not only platforms, but also advertisers and services using advertising). The strengthening of this Code is in addition to the binding framework that the Digital Services Act (DSA) will introduce for certain platforms. Work is in progress.

## **The proposed Cyber Directive (NIS 2)**

The aim of the Directive is to ensure a high, common level of cybersecurity in the European Union. While the NIS Directive left it to Member States to identify essential service operators (ESOs), this revision proposed by the European Commission has broadened the scope, establishing two types of operators - essential and important - that are identified on the basis of the sectors referred to in the annex and their size (VSEs/SMEs being in principle excluded).

These operators will have to secure their entire networks, not just information systems deemed essential.

Scientific and technological research, taking full account of ethical requirements, contributes to meeting security challenges and helps to strengthen the resilience of our democratic societies: it enables us to anticipate and deal with future crises, whatever their form or origin, and it contributes to the development of new solutions to identify and manage risks. Cross-disciplinary research, calling for an active contribution from the humanities and social sciences, can also provide answers and offer new perspectives for the protection of the populace and our critical infrastructures, including through cybersecurity. The “Horizon Europe” framework programme for research and innovation with its €95.5 billion budget over the period 2021-2027, is moving in the same direction and allows us to approach the period with ambition and confidence.

For example, Pillar 2 “Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness” includes two clusters, one entitled “Digital, Industry & Space” and the other “Civil Security for Society”, which aim to develop methods and technologies for the civil security of citizens. Their calls for projects cover combating crime and terrorism, border protection, infrastructure resilience, increasing cybersecurity, disaster resilience of European society, and security research and innovation.

French strategy in the field of resilience will serve firstly to better prepare France for future crisis situations, and secondly to establish our position in international and European bodies. It can therefore serve to promote our national resilience model, while drawing on certain aspects of European work or good practice already implemented in other states, and will contribute to joint progress with our allies.

### **c) Resilience is also a major focus for our key partners**

The comparison with partners and allies makes for a better understanding of the broad spectrum of what States mean by “resilience”. The pandemic has undoubtedly accelerated or reinforced the importance of this notion, particularly through cooperation between the private and public sectors.

Although the existing examples of resilience-building policies have a strong flavour of their relevant national culture and are only imperfectly replicable across social and political environments, they do underline the importance of this area of work among our key partners, including outside the European or Atlantic framework.

In the Nordic countries, the concept of “total defence” combines and uses all of society’s military and civilian resources to prevent or manage a crisis, an armed conflict or a war. This legacy of the Cold War has been reinforced in the wake of the terrorist threat - including home-grown terrorism - and the deteriorating regional security situation. This approach calls for a high degree of coordination between different governmental levels as well as between civilian and military forces.

The UK is expected to publish its national resilience strategy in spring 2022 as a follow-up to the Integrated review through four priorities: i) establish a “whole-of-society” approach to resilience, so that individuals, businesses and organisations all play a role in building resilience, ii) consider threats and hazards in the round, so that the UK can build national resilience across the diverse range of risks facing it: malicious and nonmalicious, direct and indirect, and acute and chronic – including low-probability, catastrophic-impact events, iii) develop more capabilities – people, skills and equipment – that can be used across a range of scenarios, and iv) strengthen analytical, policy and operational tools – including the collection and use of data – to better assess cross-cutting, complex risks.

In Asia, Singapore is another model. The adoption of the concept of total defence in 1984 was necessary because of a very particular historical and geopolitical context - a city-state with no strategic depth, highly dependent on foreign trade, and with a plural society. This concept has been maintained since then through the political stability that has characterised Singapore since independence in 1965. The emergence of new threats justifies extending the areas this concept can apply. Total defence is present in all aspects of citizens’ lives and reduces public freedoms, making Singapore a hybrid democracy. It requires a substantial budget to equip and train the



armed forces, educate the population from an early age, and for active communication by the government to involve Singaporeans.

In the Middle East, Israel's geopolitical situation has led it to develop a robust operational resilience policy. The authorities are preparing minds and populations for the spectre of open conflict, which is reflected in real life by practical exercises. Institutionally, this policy is run by the Home Front Command (HFC), which plays a role similar to that of the Sécurité Civile in France. It implements the civil defence policy, protects the population and coordinates the action of the IDF with public and private civil protection agencies.

Lastly, the joint statement between France and the United States issued at the last G20 Summit on 29 October 2021 states that both countries will work to strengthen global health and health security, including efforts to end the COVID-19 pandemic and build resilience to future pandemics. Similarly, the French and US Presidents affirmed their commitment to maintaining collective defence and security, increasing resilience, building solidarity and ensuring international stability in the face of the full range of contemporary threats.

## **B. ... it must be strengthened at the national level through a pragmatic national strategy in a gradual approach**

### **1. Successive crises have highlighted the need to deepen the resilience of public and private sectors across the whole country**

The need to strengthen the concept of resilience is felt in both the public and private sectors, including in the following areas:

- better understanding of threats and risks by the people, who directly make the Nation’s resilience what it is, and then adaptation of their responses and attitudes accordingly;
- strategic autonomy in the area of critical capabilities;
- continuity of State activity and “essential services”, that go beyond the security framework of sectors of vital importance;
- countering any form of foreign interference that could undermine national cohesion and/or cooperation with our allies;
- the capacity of the state and society to cope with long-lasting crises and/or those that have a significant impact on our functioning and way of life;
- attention paid to the indirect phenomena seen during crises: looting, increased violence, social conflicts, pollution, more waste, relocation of populations, etc.

Resilience must be understood as a coherent whole: from the preparation of the State and other actors (local authorities, public hospitals, non-profits, the private sector) - through appropriate education and training - to the actual response in the event of a crisis affecting the country, via planning, shared feedback and proper anticipation.

Several public reports expand on the concept of resilience for strategic sectors (including that on the role of information on national resilience, in February 2022). In addition, the updating of the 2017 strategic review, the resilience strategy of the armed forces, directorates and services of the Ministry of the Armed Forces (published in January 2021), and the law on combating climate change and strengthening resilience (February 2021) in response to its effects are part of this process of increasing power.

Through their actions to protect the population, the police and all those working in civil security contribute to national resilience, under the authority of the prefects. The COVID-19 crisis was a further illustration of this, particularly during the first lockdown. This crisis also showed the importance of synergy between State and local authorities in the event of a national security crisis, particularly through the prefect-mayor pairing and how their respective resources dovetail.

### **2. The national resilience strategy to further an objective**

The NRS ultimately aims to strengthen France’s ability to withstand all kinds of attacks on the country’s normal life. It encompasses the areas of individual and collective morale, structures, resources and methods.

The notion of resilience will incorporate two distinct dimensions:

- **mitigate vulnerability to threats and risks after characterising them**, i.e. detect, prepare for and respond to them, including those that are not yet known and/or poorly documented;
- **be in a position to restore or even increase operational ability and capacity**, thus identifying and reinforcing robustness criteria while providing the means to galvanise the various parties involved.

### **3. Four lines of thinking to develop the NRS**

→ **Crisis prevention**

Resilience implies an ability to understand the world around us, its complexity, the dynamic forces that can make it fragile, and the crises that it experiences. This is the purpose of anticipation, which is based first of all on independence of analysis and takes the form of cross-fertilisation of ideas. Anticipation must allow us to think the unthinkable to protect against strategy upheaval. The updating of major strategy documents (White Papers, strategic review, etc.) and the drafting of sector-specific strategies encourage the development of a common culture of anticipation, and make it possible to meet current and future challenges.

This will include an assessment of the long-term territorial repercussions of the return of war to Europe. Once the risks and threats have been identified, the first crisis prevention measure is to stop them happening, so as not to have to suffer the consequences, a factor that favours the development of weak signal and early warning capabilities.

→ **Crisis preparedness**

Apart from any material considerations, preparing for when a crisis happens is mainly about people. Consequently, education and morale boosting are of paramount importance, because the strongest of State apparatus cannot withstand a collapse in the population's morale, which remains the centre of gravity of the Nation in a severe emergency. This requires a collective awareness of the need to prepare the populace, and the instilling of a shared crisis management culture. Every person therefore plays a part in the nation's resilience.

→ **Crisis response**

The improvement of emergency responses requires a planning overhaul in order to adapt scenarios, propose a range of directly applicable operational measures, and develop the cohesion of the teams tasked with doing so.

The lessons learned from recent crises also prompt a review of the government's crisis management organisation policy and its application in the field. Short-term anticipation mechanisms and strategic communication during the crisis can also be usefully consolidated.

→ **Advice and review**

The widespread use of feedback and international comparisons provides food for thought and encourages the sharing of experience between States or entities that have undergone the same crises.

The aim is to achieve a process of continuous improvement in overall crisis management. All possible expertise must be available to emergency response managers in order to maintain it over time and to involve as many talents as possible in dealing with an emergency.

**4. The national resilience strategy should gradually involve all relevant stakeholders**

Strengthening national resilience necessarily leads to the gradual involvement of all the key stakeholders in the country: State services, local authorities, economic operators (including those involved in specific protection measures), civil society and the population in general, the latter ultimately remaining the essential link in collective resilience. The national resilience strategy, which includes all of the country's stakeholders, must in the same vein apply to the whole territory of the Republic. It will therefore be necessary to ensure that all the actions envisaged can be applied in France's overseas departments, regions and communities, given the specific features of overseas legal systems, their particular exposure to significant natural risks, their relative isolation and their atypical geography.

A resilience process is based on risk and threat assessment. At this stage, planning is not, strictly speaking, based on a single general threat-assessment document, but on sector-specific assessments carried out according to the division of responsibilities stipulated in the French Defence Code, which it is advisable to reinforce.

Digital transformation is also proving to be a cross-cutting driver for all involved in the national resilience strategy. Connected and data enhanced capabilities will have an increasing role in crisis prevention and response in the future. This transformation should be seen as a contribution to resilience through data. To make it more

socially acceptable, robustness against cyberattacks and compliance with privacy legislation and the General Data Protection Regulation will be needed.

#### **5. A national resilience strategy based on pragmatic objectives**

The national resilience strategy aims to pull together all the public measures already implemented and to identify any new actions to be taken.

It therefore aims to achieve the following objectives:

1. Gain an overview of actions contributing to resilience in the field of national defence and security;
2. Determine, after interministerial consultation, the objectives and associated metrics that will have been designed when drafting the national resilience strategy to provide a shared vision of the concept of resilience;
3. Ensure better visibility of public policies contributing to national resilience through smooth public communication.

The development of an NRS is therefore not a new government plan but a pragmatic and concrete process with no aspirations to be exhaustive. As mentioned above, the notion of resilience cuts across many public policies that are not exclusively in the field of defence and national security.

A list of concrete and actions should be identified that are achievable within a realistic timeframe, even if that means including some new actions in the annual update.

#### **6. Towards a strategy that can be objectively monitored over time**

System evaluation requires the development of metrics for public policies that contribute to the resilience of the Nation.

These will reflect:

- 1) the Nation's stakeholders' vulnerability to major hazards;
- 2) their ability to revert to their normal level of operations.

These are metrics proposed by the ministries, based on existing information (qualitative or quantitative) and consistent with the collegial development phases in the national resilience strategy, making them legitimate. Their purpose is not to report what is or is not working in each ministry to senior authorities, but rather to indicate the current state of public policy taking the initial state of national resilience as the baseline.

An annual report on the development of public policies contributing to the nation's resilience would be submitted to senior authorities.

## PART 2: THREE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOR THE RESILIENCE OF THE NATION

Priority areas for action within a sustainable timeframe should be identified, even if this means placing certain actions in a medium-term window (including anticipating the impact of future environmental risks in the field of defence and national security).

### **A. Fully prepare the State for crises**

- 1) Increase risk analysis and identification of sector vulnerabilities (*develop strategic and operational anticipation, strengthen analysis of strategic dependencies*)
- 2) Have up-to-date and operational business continuity plans to ensure the functioning of public services
- 3) Bolster emergency response planning with an “all-risks” approach (*overhaul of national security planning, strengthening of territorial plans*)
- 4) Produce exercise policies at all levels (*international, inter-ministerial, inter-sectoral*)
- 5) Strengthen functions dedicated to supporting operations (*logistics, legal, networks, budget*)
- 6) Protect the most sensitive infrastructure and information (*security of vital activities, cyberdefence, protection of national defence secrets, protection of scientific and technical assets*)

### **B. Develop the human resources and physical capacity to cope**

- 1) Have a sufficiently large pool of personnel trained in crisis management (*training of public officials and government departments; mobilisation of reserves; strengthening of the department of the Senior Defence and Security Officer and prefectures/decentralised services*)
- 2) Improve the population’s crisis preparedness (*resilience culture and kits, first aid, cybersecurity culture, immediate response to an attack, knowledge of emergency numbers, sirens*)
- 3) Increase strategic reserves and stocks (*health, energy, food, fiat money, basic essentials*)
- 4) Carry out the necessary investments by mobilising all available funding (*multi-annual budgetary programming, interministerial capacity contracts, mobilisation of European funds*)
- 5) Foster innovation (*scientific and technological research, security technologies, digital tools for handling emergencies and crises*)

### **C. Adapt public communication to resilience issues**

- 1) Raising awareness of risks and threats among the general public (*rationalise public communication by creating a single gateway to useful resources and plan to make them visible on social media, develop continuing education, ensure better visibility of available MOOCs*)
- 2) Provide the most effective crisis communication possible
- 3) Ensure that the NRS is endorsed by our main partners
- 4) Coordinate and structure crisis communication at all levels